Microeconomic Aspects of Economic Growth in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, 1950-2000 by Guriev, Sergei & Ickes, Barry W.
Microeconomic aspects of Economic Growth in Eastern
Europe and the Former Soviet Union, 1950-2000
By: Sergei Guriev and Barry W. Ickes
Working Paper Number 348
November 2000Microeconomic Aspects of Economic Growth in
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union,
1950-2000∗
Sergei Guriev￿ Barry W. Ickes￿
Abstract
The theme of this paper is the microeconomics of economic growth
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Newly Independent States
(NIS) over the period 1950-2000. The key structural change in this region is
the end of the socialist regime in 1989 and 1992, and the subsequent attempt
at transition to a market economy. We begin the paper with an examina-
tion of the key legacies from the socialist period. We then examine the key
microeconomic actors in transition economies: households, enterprises, and
government oﬃcials. Although there are many common processes at work,
diﬀerences in economic performance tend to coincide with the geographical
divide. Legacies play an important part. We also argue that diﬀerences
in openness also plays an important role in generating diﬀerent outcomes.
These factors, combined with defects in the political and legal system, have
given rise to a vicious circle of resistance to reform in the NIS.
∗This paper is a part of the Global Research Project ￿Explaining Growth￿ sponsored by the
Global Development Network. The views expressed are those of the authors and should not
be attributed to the World Bank and other sponsors. We thank Gur Ofer and Lyn Squire
for their numerous suggestions and advice at many stages of this work. We are also grateful
for comments from Francois Bourguignon, Nauro Campos, Micael Castanheira, Angus Deaton,
Bill Easterly, Randy Filer, Tore Gylfason, Manny Jimenez, Eric Livny, Valery Makarov, Janet
Mitchell, Vladimir Popov, and conference participants in Prague, Cairo, Bonn and Moscow for
helpful discussions and comments.
￿The New Economic School (email: sguriev@nes.ru).
￿Department of Economics, The Pennsylvania State University, and The New Economic
School (email: bwickes@psu.edu).Non-Technical Summary
The purpose of this paper is to examine the microeconomic aspects of growth in
the economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Newly Independent States
(NIS). Growth in this region is dominated by the response to economic transition from
the command economy. The transition process represents a structural break from the
growth process of the socialist period. Resumption of growth thus requires a successful
resolution of the transition. In some CEE countries a sustainable turnaround to growth,
recovering and even exceeding pre-reform GDP levels, has already taken place. In the
NIS, on the other hand, most economies are still experiencing output decline or
stagnation. Explaining the contrasts in performance along the microeconomic dimension
is the primary goal of this paper.
Let us first define the major microeconomic determinants of growth in a transition
economy by looking at the main microeconomic agents, i.e. firms and households. For a
developing economy to grow, households should choose to save and accumulate human
capital, and then supply that capital and labor to emerging firms. In transition countries,
the situation is somewhat different, since their economies have already been
industrialized. The labor force has acquired the necessary technical skills and the physical
assets are in place. Moreover, there exist large enterprises that resemble modern capitalist
firms. Therefore, the microeconomic problems of transition are slightly different from
those of development.
Households choose how much to save and in which firms to work. Also, they may
choose to become entrepreneurs and establish new businesses. Existing firms make the
restructuring choices, changing both outputs and inputs, including the size and
composition of their workforces.
We begin with a discussion of the pre-reform growth experience, trying to
identify the legacies that influence the experience of growth patterns in transition. We
argue that the Soviet growth model placed the emphasis on extensive rather than
intensive growth. The system provided few incentives for the diffusion of innovations, or
for the establishment of new firms and technologies. This resulted in very low elasticities
of substitution of labor and capital, implying that the return to increasing capital intensity
decreased dramatically during the latter period of socialism. The most important
implications of the Soviet growth experience for the NIS countries were: (i) the
geographical concentration of industry; and (ii) a structure of physical and human capital
that is incompatible with the market economy. A related problem is the inherited
transportation infrastructure. Given the large distances and the lack of competition in the
distribution sector, markets are geographically segmented and regional monopolies have
emerged.
We then look at recent developments in terms of the issues identified above. First,
the level of household savings does not seem to be a problem. Given the under-developed
financial systems, households hold precautionary savings at very high levels to insure
themselves against negative in-come shocks. Also, households have tended to restore
their stocks of savings, which were wiped out by hyperinflation at the beginning of the
reforms. The problem, of course, is not the supply of savings but the demand. The
banking system is still so immature that households prefer capital flight, including
holding cash dollars. We also study private transfers. These have declined during thetransition, but they still account for a substantial share of household incomes and play an
important role in the alleviation of poverty and the financing of start-up businesses.
Our paper then discusses the accumulation of human capital. In terms of current
levels of human capital, the NIS are doing as well as OECD countries, if not better. On
the other hand, the stock of skills may not be suitable for the market economy. The Soviet
education system has been very strong in mathematics and engineering, while marketing
and finance skills are virtually absent. Another challenge is the long-term impact of a
fiscal system under stress. It is not necessarily clear that the educational system that
produced high levels of human capital under socialism can be maintained in the current
environment.
The major microeconomic differences between CEE and NIS countries are low
labor mobility, the lack of restructuring of existing firms and the slow formation of new
businesses. What are the major impediments to labor mobility in the NIS? The key to
under-standing mobility in the former Soviet Union is, again, the legacy of the Soviet
growth model. Soviet industrialization resulted in a high geographical concentration of
industry. Russia's industrial landscape reminds an observer of that of the US or the UK in
the early stages of industrialization. There are whole towns and even regions with one
single major employer. Huge distances also make these monopsonistic labor markets
segmented. Therefore labor mobility is pretty much related to geographical mobility.
Geographical mobility is, in turn, very costly in an economy with under-developed credit
and housing markets. Cash-constrained workers cannot finance a move to a new place of
work, even if they expect a higher wage there. Their liquidity constraints are aggravated
(sometimes strategically) by the payment of wages in kind and in social benefits, and by
wage arrears. Many large enterprises have inherited various social assets. Some
enterprises prefer to pay wages in the form of social benefits (such as housing, healthcare,
recreation, catering, etc.) rather than in cash in order to limit the mobility of workers and
to exploit the fact that the worker is unable to move.
To establish and run a new business is also much harder in the NIS than in CEE.
Small businesses in CEE face tough competition. In the NIS, however, the problem is
more the government's predatory behavior. Small businesses are taxed and regulated at
exorbitant rates. In order to survive, they hide all or some of their revenues and become
part of the unofficial economy. Once in the unofficial economy, the firm can no longer
ask the state for contract enforcement and protection. These services are provided by
corrupt bureaucrats and organized crime, which extracts high rents. This dichotomy
explains why small business growth is so different in CEE and the NIS. In a competitive
world, investment that significantly reduces marginal cost is profitable and therefore will
be undertaken. In the NIS, however, the fruits of the investment will be expropriated by
rent-seekers. Also, investment and growth make a firm more visible, less mobile and,
therefore, more vulnerable to bribery and extortion.
One of the important lessons of economic transition in the NIS is that
privatization does not necessarily result in restructuring. There are two sets of problems
that impede the restructuring of privatized firms in the NIS. First, due to soft budget
constraints and poor corporate governance, firm managers often do not maximize profits.
Outside investors cannot effectively control managers. But restructuring requires a
certain amount of investment. Without external finance, firms can only rely on the re-
investment of profits, which are rather low precisely be-cause of the lack of restructuring.The second problem is the lack of competition and openness in the NIS. Firms in CEE
economies can compete in export markets. Due to the huge distances and the high degree
of asset specificity inherited from the Soviet industrial structure, many firms in the NIS
are locked into a pre-reform customer base. The costs of restructuring are extremely high.
Another barrier to restructuring is political pressure. Since restructuring results in
an (at least temporary) increase in unemployment, both federal and local politicians are
interested in delaying restructuring and may allocate explicit or implicit subsidies and
benefits to managers to preserve excess employment. (Certainly, this pressure exists in
CEE economies as well, but it is much weaker because of the openness. Moreover,
forthcoming EU accession provides an end-game benchmark for any projectionist
policies.)
Is there any light at the end of the tunnel? The 1998 devaluation has given Russian firms
a unique chance to compete in export markets and in the domestic markets that were
previously dominated by imports. It is evident that firms have taken advantage of this
opportunity, not only by increasing sales at unprecedented rates but also by using some of
the revenues for structural changes. For the first time since 1991, the share of barter in
inter-firm transactions has showed a clear tendency to decline. But it is still too early to
judge whether the vicious circle of survival without restructuring has been broken.1. Introduction
The theme of this paper is the microeconomics of economic growth in Central and
Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Newly Independent States (NIS) over the period
1950-2000. In this region, however, there is a marked structural change that
results from the end of the socialist regime in 1989 and 1992, and the subsequent
attempt at transition to a market economy. Consequently, the focus of analysis
will necessarily be on the nature of the growth process in the transition.
Although there is considerable variation in growth performance within the
sub-regions of CEE and NIS, it is apparent from the data that the primary dif-
ference is across these two regions (see [20]). Especially with regard to economic
restructuring of enterprises, the CEE and NIS look very diﬀerent.1 Explaining the
contrasts in performance along this dimension is an over-riding goal of the paper.
This paper studies the behavioral responses to constraints that arise in relation
to the major actors in transition economies: households and enterprises.2 We look
at the households￿ decisions to save, to supply labor and to accumulate human
capital. We study development of new ￿rms and restructuring of existing ones.
The paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 reviews the most important
features of growth before the transition and discusses the key legacies that the
transition economies inherited from the Soviet growth model. Section 3 sets out
possible microeconomic components of economic growth in transition economies,
namely, the restructuring of existing ￿rms￿ and new ￿rm formation as well as
households saving and labor supply decisions. Section 4 discusses the behavior of
households. Section 5 studies ￿rm restructuring and Section 6 looks at new ￿rm
formation. Section 7 concludes.
2. The Soviet Growth Model
The growth performance in transition cannot be fully understood without an
analysis of the legacies of the planned economy. Our concern is with those legacies
that impact on the microeconomic aspects of the growth process. We begin by
1The extent to which Bulgaria and especially Romania look more like NIS than CEE is an
important issue. It is also interesting to note that Poland is the leading CEE with respect to
new entry, but that its solution to the dilemma of state enterprises lags behind.
2T h es c o p eo ft h ep a p e ri st h em i c r o e c o n o m i c so fg r o w t h .W et a k et h ec o n s t r a i n t st h e￿rms
and households face as given. See [44] for an account of development of markets in transition
economies and [22] for a discussion of choice of economic policies in transition economies.
2Population
1997, 000
 GDP per
capita 1997,
PPP (USD $)
Average
growth rate
in 1991-97
Average
growth rate
in 1989-97
Armenia 3,787    2 360 -10,6% N/A
Azerbaijan 7,600    1 550 -13,0% -12,1%
Belarus 10,267    4 850 -4,3% -2,8%
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
2,346 N/A N/A N/A
Bulgaria 8,312    4 010 -4,3% -4,8%
Croatia 4,768 N/A N/A N/A
Czech Republic 10,304   10 510 -1,3% -0,7%
Estonia 1,458    5 240 -3,4% -3,1%
Georgia 5,427    1 960 -15,0% -14,1%
Hungary 10,155    7 200 -0,9% -1,0%
Kazakhstan 15,801    3 560 -7,0% -6,1%
Kyrgyz Republic 4,635    2 250 -7,7% -5,1%
Latvia 2,465    3 940 -8,3% -6,1%
Lithuania 3,706    4 220 -6,1% -3,5%
Macedonia, FYR 1,997    3 210 N/A N/A
Moldova 4,312    1 500 -13,4% -10,0%
Poland 38,650    6 520 3,4% 1,3%
Romania 22,554    4 310 -1,9% -2,8%
Russian Federation 147,307    4 370 -6,9% N/A
Slovak Republic 5,383    7 910 -0,3% -0,4%
Slovenia 1,986   11 800 0,6% N/A
Tajikistan 6,017 N/A N/A N/A
Turkmenistan 4,658 N/A N/A N/A
Ukraine 50,698    2 190 -11,8% -9,6%
Uzbekistan 23,667 N/A -1,8% -0,9%
Yugoslavia, FR
(Serbia/Montenegro)
10,614 N/A N/A N/A
Figure 1.1: Selected indicators for NIS and CEE countries.
3looking at the main features of growth in the Soviet-type economies (STEs). These
features ￿ dubbed the Soviet Growth Model (SGM) ￿ were applied in various
forms in all the socialist economies. We then explain why rapid rates of economic
growth, observed initially in all planned economies, eventually slowed down. We
will then identify the key legacies inherited from the Soviet period which may
in￿uence microeconomics of growth in transition.
2.1. The Soviet Growth Model
The Soviet Growth Model (SGM) is a mechanism for extensive growth, that is,
growth via the accumulation of inputs rather than through more eﬃcient use of
inputs. Resources, human and physical, are mobilized to that task via a system
of central planning.
The SGM was eﬀective, if we ignore for the moment the cost, at rapidly indus-
trializing the Soviet economy and other planned economies. In the Soviet case,
a predominantly agricultural economy became, in less than three generations, an
industrial power, at least when measured by gross production of autos, cement,
oil, and steel. In Central Europe the SGM was imposed ￿ to varying degrees ￿ on
economies that had already started to industrialize ￿ in Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
the GDR, for example ￿ and in countries that were relatively less developed (e.g.,
Bulgaria and Romania). Over time, however, the performance of the SGM began
to steadily decline. Although the exact timing of this decline varies depending
on how output is measured, the steady decline was evidenced throughout the
region. This is evident in ￿gure 2.1 which uses oﬃcial data on output growth.
Although this clearly overstates the absolute growth rate the downward trend in
performance is unmistakable.
Growth rates of output per worker decreased from 5.8% from 1950-59 to 2.1%
in the 1970￿s and 1.4% in the 1990￿s [35]. This was due to a noticeable deterioration
in productivity growth, which turned negative in the 1960￿s and remained so till
the end of the regime.3
3There is an important question of interpretation involved here. If one assumes that labor
and capital could be freely substituted, then estimates of total factor productivity are as stated
in the text. If one assumes, following Weitzman, that such substitution is costly, then total
factor productivity growth does not become negative. Rather the slowdown in Soviet growth
is explained by more rapid growth of capital inputs compared with labor, resulting in reduced
output growth due to the inability to substitute inputs. Much debate has centered on which
interpretation is correct [see [94] and [35], for example], but both explanations are consistent
with the defects we discuss.
4Bulgaria Czechoslovakia
German
Democratic 
Republic Hungary Poland Romania USSR
1951-55 12.2 8.1 13.2 5.7 8.6 14.2 11.3
1956-60 9.6 7.0 7.4 6.0 6.6 6.6 9.2
1961-65 6.6 1.9 3.5 4.5 6.2 9.1 5.7
1966-70 8.7 6.9 5.0 6.7 5.9 7.7 7.1
1971-75 7.9 5.7 5.4 6.3 9.7 11.3 5.1
1976-80 6.1 3.7 4.1 2.8 1.2 7.2 3.7
1981-85 3.7 1.8 4.5 1.4 -0.8 4.4 3.2
1986-90 -0.5 1.0 -1.8 -0.5 -0.5 -3.5 1.3
Figure 2.1: Growth in Net Material Product in Selected Planned Economies.
source: [87]
Our focus in this paper is microeconomic aspects of growth, hence in this
section we consider microeconomic defects of the SGM in order to understand
the growth slowdown. In particular, we want to explore microeconomic causes of
the extensive growth trap. The extensive growth trap arises because over time it
becomes more and more diﬃcult to mobilize resources. Extensive growth requires
high input growth. In the early stages of industrialization high input growth can
be achieved by shifting labor from traditional sectors, e.g., the countryside, to
the modern sector. High growth in the labor force can be achieved by moving
people from agriculture to industry. But as this reserve is used up, labor force
participation reaches an upper limit. After that, labor force growth is constrained
by fertility. One can still accumulate capital at a high rate, but now the capital-
labor ratio will rise, and if this causes the marginal product of capital to fall, then
the growth of output will lag.4 This is the extensive growth trap.5
4Ignoring growth in technical progress (since we are considering extensive growth), per-capita
output growth can be written as
dy
y = Fk
k
y
dk
k where y is per-capita output, k is capital per
worker, and Fk is the marginal product of capital. Extensive growth means that the capital-
output ratio is increasing with growth in k. The eﬀect of this on growth thus depends on what
happens to Fk. The key issue is whether the marginal product of capital decreases faster than
the capital￿s share in income increases. If the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor
is low, then the marginal product of capital will fall rapidly as capital is substituted for labor.
Later on, we will address the issue of low elasticity of substitution.
5To see the problem with sustained extensive growth, note that I
K = I
Y
Y
K,w h e r eI is in-
vestment, Y is output, and K is the capital stock. Extensive growth implies that capital grows
5The extensive growth trap resulted, in part, from the key success of the SGM,
its success at mobilization. The SGM is best suited to mobilizing resources. So
the key to industrialization is seen in the growth of heavy industry. Now this
model may have been eﬀective when the level of terror was high. As socialism
develops, however, it becomes more and more diﬃcult to maintain such forced
industrialization. Consumption cannot be deferred. But when growth is not
achieved through forced industrialization it must be achieved through intensive
means, primarily via technical change. This the Soviet economy was ill-suited for;
instead the SGM fell victim to the extensive growth trap.
A critical question is why it proved so diﬃcult to escape the extensive growth
trap. One explanation, of course, is that in a STE there is no self-correcting
mechanism, as in a market economy.6 In a market economy if investments are
earning inadequate rates of return, capital ￿ows elsewhere. In the STE, however,
investment continued to go into activities where the rates of return were very low.
This points to a fundamental problem with planned economies, the absence of a
market for capital. One of the distinguishing features of socialism was precisely
the elimination of private ownership of capital.
The fundamental point is that while STE￿s managed to invest increasingly
greater shares of income, the investments were of poor quality because of the
informational problems in the economy and the lack of incentives for eﬃcient
investment. The public was forced (savings were not voluntary, of course) to
postpone consumption for the future, but these resources were invested so poorly
faster than income, so Y
K must be decreasing over time (CIA recalculations of Soviet national
income show the capital-output ratio rising four-fold between 1928 and 1987, while oﬃcial data
shows it almost tripling between 1958 and 1987, see [94] and [35]). Thus for constant growth
rates of the capital stock the investment-output ratio must rise continuously. This is the essence
of the trap. Extensive growth causes the capital-output ratio to rise, so to maintain growth
rates, growth must become even more extensive. Of course, the problem is not quite that stark,
because as an economy develops the relative (shadow) price of investment goods decreases over
time. So some accumulation of machines can occur without I
Y rising due to the relative price
adjustment. But once this price change has been absorbed, further extensive growth can only
take place by devoting higher and higher proportions of income for investment. Thus the ratio of
I
Y stood at around 14% in 1950, rising to 33% by 1980. Nonetheless growth rates of per-capita
income declined during this period (see [94]).
6This is perhaps a key diﬀerence between the Soviet Union and the NIC￿s. As [114] argues,
East Asian growth has also largely relied on the factor accumulation, rather than on outstanding
total factor productivity performance. However, the East Asian countries seem to have avoided
the extensive growth trap. In the NIC￿s the market may prevent investment from ￿owing to
uses where the marginal product of capital is low. See [85] for a comparison of Soviet and East
Asian growth models.
6that no positive return was earned.
Note that extensive growth also meant that enterprises used resources inef-
￿ciently. Energy was underpriced and over-utilized. The same is true for other
primary commodities. The implication of this is that when prices are liberal-
ized many industries are producing negative value added: the value of output
is less than the value of the inputs used in production.7 This is fundamentally a
pricing problem. The capital was invested in technologies that were highly energy-
intensive that would only be pro￿table under the distorted prices. We will discuss
the implications when we come to price liberalization.
2.2. Microeconomic Aspects of the Soviet Growth Model
There are several institutional features of the SGM that must be highlighted to
emphasize the contrast with market economies.
2.2.1. Enterprises
Enterprises in the SGM were motivated by plan ful￿llment. Bonuses and career
paths depended on producing output in accord with the plan. Because plans
were generally taut, output plans superceded all other considerations. Although
plans contained indicators for quality, cost, technical improvement, etc., these
considerations were not binding.
Another key characteristic of planning was that information ￿ows were pri-
marily vertical rather than horizontal.8 Although more true of the formal design
than actual practice, the interaction between enterprises was organized by superior
planning bodies. An important implication of the administrative, or bureaucratic,
coordination mechanism in the STE is that enterprises were heavily dependent on
personal relationships.9 Exchanges in the planned economy were predicated on the
identity of the transactors rather than the actual details themselves. The empha-
sis on idiosyncratic exchange is just the opposite of ￿arm￿s length transactions￿
that are thought to be central to market economies.
7In 1935 Hayek had already noted that: ￿The best tractor factory may not be an asset, and
the capital invested in it is a sheer loss, if the labour which the tractor replaces is cheaper than
the cost of the material and labour which goes to make a tractor, plus interest￿ [64].
8See [66] for a discussion of the formal and informal organization of the Soviet-type economy.
9See [54, chapter 2] for a discussion of relational capital, its origin in the planned economy
and its revelance in the Russian transition.
72.2.2. Price System
Prices in the planned economy were administratively determined and typically
remained stable for long periods of time. This aided the process of planning, but
obviously negated the allocation role of prices. This was tolerable in the planning
regime because prices were primarily used to monitor enterprise transactions. As
explained above (section 2.2.1) inter-enterprise transactions were organized from
above. Planning of inter-enterprise ￿ows was primarily conducted based on the
￿achieved level￿ (which of course created the celebrated ratchet eﬀect).
Producer prices in the STE￿s were set primarily on the basis of ￿socially nec-
essary costs.￿ In eﬀect, this meant that costs were based on average, rather than
marginal, cost.10 An important consequence was that land rent and rental rates
for capital were not included in costs of production. At the same time, prices were
often set to encourage certain types of behavior: for example, low prices for mod-
ern agricultural machinery to encourage diﬀusion [83, 150]. Prices also diﬀered
according the user. The same output would have a higher price when shipped to
consumer goods industries compared with defense and heavy industry.
An important consequence of the socialist price mechanism was that it hid the
true sectoral production of value added in the economy.11 Industry and manu-
facturing appeared to generate a larger share of value added than was actually
the case. This was especially true in the Soviet Union, where the extent to which
value added was generated by the raw materials ￿ especially energy ￿ sector
was hidden from view. Soviet pricing thus created a distorted picture of the ac-
tual economy. Moreover, the nature and extent of these distortions would only be
revealed after liberalization.
10In the command economy, ￿the relevant cost has had to be average cost for the industry,
rather than marginal cost or average cost of the marginal ￿rm. After all, with the establish-
ment of the command economy the chief function of wholesale prices became the ￿accounting￿
(uchetnaia) function, i.e., planning and controlling the ￿nancial ￿ows of the enterprise and the
branch. For this purpose, industry average cost is clearly suited better than the other two kinds
of cost￿ [60, 135].
11The implications of Soviet pricing on the perceived structure of the economy is examined
extensively in a recent study by Richard Ericson [39]. He shows how the input-output tables of
the Soviet economy ￿ which appeared to provide a consistent picture of the underlying structure
￿ could appear to describe an economy where sectors are able to cover average cost when in
fact they do not. The fundamental factor, of course, is pricing that is not based on scarcity.
Since prices were based on costs and costs were measured arbitrarily, there was a ￿circularity
in de￿nition￿ as Ericson calls it, one that could not be eliminated within the structure of the
Soviet system.
8A related implication of the socialist price mechanism was that it created
arti￿cial returns to speci￿c activities. From the standpoint of the leadership,
the returns to speci￿c assets were irrelevant, since they (or ￿the State￿) owned all
property anyway. But with the onset of transition, the distorted picture of relative
productivities would be a serious problem. Economic liberalization ￿ freedom to
set prices based on supply and demand and free consumer and producer choice
￿ began to unmask the true relative eﬃciencies of various activities and pointed
to their true viability. It showed the extent to which the Soviet-type economy
had been producing the ￿wrong things in the wrong way.￿ Many sectors that
had appeared to be value-creating turned out to be value-destroying.12 In the
case of the former Soviet Union, price liberalization revealed the extent to which
value added was really created in the energy and raw materials sector. For many
people, however, it had the eﬀect of making reform appear to be the destroyer of
the manufacturing sector.13
2.2.3. Labor Supply
The allocation of labor in the planning system was centrally controlled on the de-
mand side but primarily market-driven on the supply side.14 The direct allocation
of labor to tasks was rare.15 Instead relative wages (inclusive of generous fringe
bene￿ts) were used to induce labor to ￿ow to high priority occupations [58].
Unemployment in planned economies as kept low was a product of over-full
employment planning. There is some controversy concerning whether this is due
to a policy preference of the leadership for full employment [58] or a consequence
of soft-budget constraints [83]. Of course, low unemployment was achieved at
the expense of high levels of underemployment, with its attendant consequences
for economic eﬃciency. The critical implication for households, however, was
that income risk due to forced job separation was rare compared with market
economies.16
12This eﬀect was magni￿ed by the decision to open up transition economies to the world
market, thus imposing world prices as the new standard of value. Once domestic prices moved
to market-clearing levels, many industrial enterprises could not cover costs. Raising prices only
led to unsold output.
13The argument sometimes goes as far as blaming the reforms for deindustrialization of the
economy and degradation of the society.
14See [58, chapter 2] for a discussion of the Soviet labor market as a market.
15The major exception was prison labor, of course.
16Although voluntary separations were not all that uncommon. In the Soviet Union quits
rates were on the same order of magnitude as the UK or Germany, though less than in the
91960 1970 1980 1985
Socialist Countries
Bulgaria 83.4 88.5 92.5 93.3
Czechoslovakia 67.3 79.9 91.3 92.4
East Germany 72.7 79.1 83.6 86.1
Hungary 51.8 69.4 83.2 84.7
Poland 69.1 79.5 83.2 84.7
Romania 76.4 79.5 83.1 85.1
Soviet Union 77.9 93.2 96.9 96.8
North Euro pean
Countries 39.9 53.8 69.9 71.1
West European 
Countries 39.5 46.4 55.1 55.6
South European 
Countries 25.3 29.7 35.7 37.1
source: Kornai (1992: 207).
Figure 2.2: Labor Force Participation of Women in the Age Group 40-44.
Another peculiar feature of Soviet labor markets was the very high labor-
force participation rate of women (￿gure 2.2) compared with market economies.
As discussed in [95, 18-20], it is hard to explain these high rates using economic
variables alone. This suggests that systemic features of the system generated such
high rates ￿ an implication that gained support as labor-force participation rates
for women declined during transition.
2.2.4. Households
The absence of private property in planned economies eliminated an important
source of income variation. It is not surprising that income distribution was more
equal under socialism than capitalism. What is more important for our purposes,
however, is the observation about collective consumption: that is, consumption
United States [58, 16-17]. The workers were allowed to change job but were not encouraged
staying unemployed. Moreover, the Soviet Criminal Code contained an article that prosecuted
tuneyadstvo (￿idleness￿).[29]
10￿nanced by the state budget. Although collective consumption as a share of
GDP was not much higher under socialism than capitalism [83, 314],17 there was
one critical diﬀerence. If we take the share of collective consumption that could
be distributed through markets ￿ e.g. pharmaceuticals ￿ and compare this to
total consumption (collective plus individual), this share is much higher in the
socialist countries. Thus, for 1969 this share was 49% in the East Germany,
44.2% in Poland, and 48.9% in the Soviet Union, while in France the ratio was
15.1%, in Italy 18.0%, and Switzerland 30.7% [83, 314]. This diﬀerence re￿ects
the paternalistic character of the socialist economy.
It is important to note that much collective consumption under socialism was
provided by the enterprise. This is true for housing, clinics, cafeteria, sanatoria.
When combined with the job security provided by the enterprise the social nature
of this organization comes into view. This is an important element to keep in
mind when we turn to transition. The enterprise in the Soviet-type system was
more than just an economic unit. This means that reforming it will be more
complicated than simply changing the ownership structure.
The importance of the enterprise in providing collective consumption will also
feature in our discussion of labor markets under transition. This heritage of non-
pecuniary compensation continues to some extent under transition and is a feature
that reduces job mobility and increases the social cost of enterprise restructuring.
2.3. Key Legacies from Soviet Period
The legacy of the Soviet experience is that of an ineﬃcient economic system.
These ineﬃciencies are myriad, but we can consider three main types: those that
are internal to organizations; those that are external in the sense of misallocation
of resources, and; those that are dynamic.
2.3.1. Internal Ineﬃciency
When considering the microeconomic aspects of growth one should pay special
attention to internal ineﬃciency. One might argue that allocative ineﬃciency ￿
due to the absence of a proper price mechanism ￿ was the key problem of the
planned economy, but from the microeconomic perspective the poor incentive
structure of the STE must be emphasized. The primary responsibility of the
17For example, with respect to provision of education, health, welfare spending, socialist
countries were not that much diﬀerent from capitalist countries, especially European ones.
11enterprise was plan ful￿llment not pro￿t maximization. Enterprise directors that
were successful were those that found ways to ful￿ll the plan. Producing a better
mousetrap, or ￿n d i n gam e t h o do fp r o d u c i n gam o u s e t r a pa tal o w e rc o s tw a s
not rewarded.18 The emphasis on plan ful￿l l m e n tc a m ea tt h ee x p e n s eo fc o s t
minimization and innovation.19 Reducing costs was not important to the director
of a Soviet enterprise. This could risk plan ful￿llment, and any gains would be
taxed away anyway.
2.3.2. External Ineﬃciency
We use the term external ineﬃciency to refer to problems external to the enter-
prise. The most basic cause of external ineﬃciency in the planned economy is
allocative ineﬃciency that results from an ineﬀective price mechanism. Similarly,
t h ea b s e n c eo fac a p i t a lm a r k e tl e dt oi n e ﬃcient use of capital across industries.
As these problems are well-known we focus on two additional problems, industrial
structure and distribution.
Industrial Structure The industrial structure transition economies inherited
from the Soviet system has important characteristics that aﬀect transition: an
emphasis on size and an absence of small enterprises. Stalinist planners empha-
sized gigantic plants, known as gigantomania.20 As one observer put it: ￿In the
socialist countries, large size and economic eﬃciency were thought to be synony-
mous [38, 293].￿ Plants were often extremely large. Indeed, according to [38]
average enterprise size in Hungary and Poland was greater than in large capitalist
economies. The diﬀerence in size is consistent across sectors, as indicated in ￿gure
2.3.
One reason for this is that enterprises in the STE tended to be located in
a single area, whereas large western companies tend to have plants dispersed
geographically. This tendency has led to signi￿cant geographical concentration
18Indeed, the system biased against such eﬀorts, as any gains would be taxed away via the
ratchet, while the costs of achieving such gains would fall on the director.
19The argument of [103] is that socialist enterprises were ineﬃcient because of government
intervention. That is, planners induced the enterprise to undertake activities that they would
not otherwise do. One example would be overmanning of enterprises.
20As Wiles noted: ￿There is something ￿socialist￿ and ￿progressive￿ about mere size, even
if unaccompanied by lower costs. Gigantomania as such, then, reinforces the view that large
capital expenditures are a good thing, even where smaller ones will do￿ [112, 304]
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Total Manufacturing
Average employment per firm 197 80
Percentage of those employed
in firms with more than 500 workers 66 32
Textile Industry
Average employment per firm 355 81
Percentage of those employed
in firms with more than 500 workers 75 17
Ferrous Metals
Average employment per firm 2,542 350
Percentage of those employed
in firms with more than 500 workers 95 79
Machinery
Average employment per firm 253 82
Percentage of those employed
in firms with more than 500 workers 61 28
Chemicals
Average employment per firm 325 104
Percentage of those employed
in firms with more than 500 workers 79 35
Food Processing
Average employment per firm 103 65
Percentage of those employed
in firms with more than 500 workers 39 16
Source: Ehrlich (1985)
aSample, including Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, and Poland.
bSample, including Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, and Sweden
Figure 2.3: Size Distribution of Industrial Firms: International Comparison, 1970.
13of industry. This is especially true in the Russian economy which is much more
regionally specialized than western economies, including the United States.
While the extent to which enterprises in the Soviet Union and other transition
economies were excessive in size has often been exaggerated in the literature,[16]
what is critical is that small enterprises were missing from the landscape. It is
interesting, for example, to compare the size distribution of industry in Russia
with that of the Unites States.21 In the latter most employment is concentrated
in small ￿rms (less than 250 workers) or in very large ￿rms (greater than 10,000
workers). These enterprises comprised two-thirds of industrial employment in the
US compared with only 25% in Russia. Russia has both less extra large ￿rms and
less small ￿rms. Most striking is the diﬀerence with respect to small ￿rms, where in
Russia 91.5 percent of civilian employment and an estimated 94.5 percent of total
(i.e., including defense) employment in manufacturing is provided by enterprises
with employment of 250 or greater, while only 73.1 percent of US. manufacturing
employment is provided by similar ￿rms.
The lack of small enterprises in the Soviet economy no doubt was an important
factor inhibiting innovation and technical change. New ideas often are developed
in new ￿rms, and most new ￿rms start out small. The absence of the dynamism
created by small ￿rms may be an important element in the deterioration of per-
formance in the Soviet economy.
In addition to the absence of small ￿rms in the Soviet economy it is usually
asserted that Russia suﬀers from a monopoly problem. This is less of a problem
than is usually recognized, however. As is shown in [16], Russian industry is
not that highly concentrated. While Russia has many concentrated industries
these tend to be small and account for a small proportion of employment. Most
employment takes place in sectors that are not highly concentrated.
The other aspect of the industrial structure that has impacted on economic
performance is the relatively closed nature of the economy. Although STE￿s en-
gaged in trade both within and outside the socialist bloc, enterprises were quar-
antined from the eﬀects of external shocks. Trade was conducted through foreign
trade ministries. This provided for a separation of domestic and foreign prices.
Moreover, trade was viewed primarily as a means of obtaining inputs that could
not be produced domestically. Exports were viewed as a cost because it meant
that less of the particular output was available to meet domestic demand. Hence,
there has always been political pressure to achieve self-suﬃciency which of course
21This section follows [16]. The comparison is made using the 1987 census of manufacturing
for the US, and the 1989 Soviet census of industry for Russia.
14encourage investment into ineﬃcient enterprises that are not competitive in the
world economy.
Distribution and Supply Perhaps one of most important legacies of central
planning is the rigid supply and distribution system. State systems of distribution
and supply were common throughout the region, with the exception of Hungary
under the NEM, and replaced the traditional intra-￿rm relations common in mar-
ket economies. These rigid supply networks result in market segmentation.
Although all STE￿s suﬀered from ineﬀective distribution systems, these prob-
lems were exacerbated in the former Soviet Union (FSU) due to its sheer size.
Location decisions in the Soviet Union were made without suﬃcient attention
paid to costs. Moreover, the distribution system was centrally organized and
Moscow-centric.
The essential feature of Russian industrial structure, then, is that potential
competition is inhibited by poor transportation infrastructure.22 Russia is, after
all, a very large country, and the transportation and distribution system inherited
from the Soviet period was not designed to create national markets. Moreover,
the underdevelopment of the ￿nancial and legal system serve as entry barriers.
These supporting institutions (distribution, ￿nance, law, and transportation) may
much more important to developing competition as any technological barriers (i.e.,
economies of scale). Although the potential for competition to develop through
changing product lines and new entry appears signi￿cant, the inadequacy of these
supporting institutions may prove to be a signi￿cant barrier to eﬀective competi-
tion for years to come.
These problems are aggravated by the above mentioned market concentration.
In STE￿s small ￿rms were absent not only in manufacturing but also in the trade
sector. The transition economies have inherited monopolized distribution system
which constrained ￿rm￿s choice of new suppliers and new customers.
Many of these problems impact NIS economies more that CEE ones. The
reasons are multiple. First, the geography is more favorable in CEE: the distances
are shorter so that transportation is cheaper. Second, the CEE economies are more
open being closer to the West and suﬀering less from the self-suﬃciency ideology.
22As the authors of the IMF-World Bank-OECD-EBRD joint study on the Soviet economy
argued: ￿Even where more than one enterprise exists, the national aggregates hide a high
degree of regional monopoly power that is protected by generally poor communications and
transportation and by administered marketing channels which, in turn, are insulated from one
another by ministerial lines of responsibility￿ [71, 16].
15Therefore a monopolistic industrial structure is a heavier burden for NIS rather
than for CEE.
2.3.3. Dynamic Ineﬃciency: Diﬃculties with Innovation
The diﬃculties in fostering and diﬀusing innovation were central defects of the
system. The extensive growth trap was, most speci￿cally, a failure to achieve
technical progress. The incentive system of the planned economy worked against
innovation. Therefore transition economies have inherited outdated technologies
and no infrastructure for adoption and diﬀusion of innovation.
One factor that accounts for low rates of technical progress was the inability to
substitute capital for labor eﬀectively. The elasticity of substitution between labor
and capital was very low in STE￿s.23 The question is why? This is a rather deep
question, one that points to the heart of the SGM. To some extent it is due to the
inability to substitute capital for labor in a functional sense. That is, the enterprise
does not shed labor, it just under-employs it, due to an over-full employment
system. In STE￿s the enterprise always wants to hoard as much labor as possible,
as a reserve against taut plans. Moreover, enterprises always want to add capital
to raise capacity. So additions to the capital stock were utilized ineﬃciently due
to lack of incentives to use inputs in a cost-minimizing manner. More importantly,
however, there was a built-in input-output conservatism under planning. Plans
were based on previous plans, and this tended to inhibit substitution as well.
A second explanation of the low elasticity of substitution focuses on the ab-
sence of organizational innovation. In market economies an important source of
productivity growth is the churning of ￿rms as ￿rms expand, contract, enter, and
exit. This churning process causes resources to ￿ow to higher valued uses. In
S T E ￿ st h i sp r o c e s si sa b s e n t . C a p i t a li ss i m p l yp o u r e di n t oe x i s t i n ge n t e r p r i s e s ;
there are no entrepreneurs who are able to re-organize the production process.
The allocation of capital across enterprises is considered ￿ if, at all ￿ only in the
investment decision. Once capital is in place, it is sunk. Enterprises cannot trade
capital or capital services among themselves due to the absence of ownership.
One crucial process for improving resource allocation in market economies is
exit. Ceasing operations frees resources for more eﬀective uses. In STE￿s, there
is no mechanism for exit.24 Ineﬃcient enterprises do not cease operation. Hence,
23This was ￿rst noted by Weitzman [110]. There has been some dispute about this, however.
See [94] for a balanced discussion of the issue.
24See [68] for a model of industrial dynamics under the constraint of no exit.
16resources are not freed for alternative uses. But that is not the only cost. The
a b s e n c eo fe x i ta l s oi n ￿uences entry. Groups of workers could not form new estab-
lishment; all entry occurs only from above. Since exit was essentially non-existent
planners were reluctant to create too many new enterprises.25 This exacerbated
the static nature of economic organization. It meant the new processes had to
compete with old ones within the enterprise rather than across enterprises. This
was a signi￿cant inhibition to innovation and especially to its diﬀusion.
That Soviet-type economies were plagued with diﬃculties in achieving tech-
nical progress was recognized quite early on. Discussion of how to accelerate
technical progress, so that growth could be achieved intensively was discussed of-
ten.26 The problem is that the institutional design of the system ￿ especially the
structure of incentives ￿ did not support innovation (e.g., [7] and [30]). Indeed,
the incentive mechanism often worked to suppress innovation. It is important to
understand that the problem was not a lack of discovery. Rather, the problem
was the slow diﬀusion of innovations throughout the economy.27
There are a myriad of reasons for the slow rates of diﬀusion of innovation.
Paramount is the problem of incentives based on the current plan ful￿llment
that is endemic in planned economies. The ￿virtuous haste￿ that characterizes
Soviet planning imposes costs on potential innovators who would sacri￿ce current
production for future gains. This is critical because the gains from innovation
are taxed away by the dynamic incentives problem, the ratchet eﬀect. Better
performance resulted in higher plan targets in the next period. The enterprise
bears all the risk of innovation but loses the bene￿ts due to the ratchet. Hence,
enterprises preferred to add capital but not innovate. This is the reason why the
25Moreover, recall that an STE is supply constrained, so that there are no free resources
available to start up new entities. This means that any new activity is costly in terms of other
activities foregone; especially so to the planners.
26Compare the following speeches to Party Congresses from G. Malenkov in 1941 and M.
Gorbachev in 1986: ￿...highly valuable inventions and product improvements often lie around
for years in the scienti￿c research institutes, laboratories and enterprises, and are not introduced
into products.￿ ￿...many scienti￿c discoveries and important inventions lie around for years, and
sometimes decades, without being introduced into practical applications.￿ Quoted in [30, 1105]
27It is instructive to examine the diﬀusion rates for major innovations in the USSR compared
with some market economies. For example, oxygen steel was introduced in the USSR in 1956
and the US in 1954. By 1982 oxygen steel accounted for 29.6% of total steel production in
the USSR compared with 62% for the US. Similarly, numerically controlled machine tools were
introduced in the USSR (1965) and Japan (1964) at approximately the same time, yet by 1982
such machines accounted for 16.6% of total metal-cutting machine tools in the USSR compared
with 52.8% in Japan. See [30, 1108] for further details.
17diﬀusion of innovations in the STE was so slow. It is interesting to note that while
Stalin was alive, and hence the costs of failing to adopt innovations were higher,28
diﬀu s i o nw a sm o r er a p i dt h a ni nl a t e rp e r i o d s .
2.4. Summary
We have focused on systemic legacies of the Soviet growth model for the transition
process and highlighted instances where systematic diﬀerences exist between the
NIS and CEE￿s. Our discussion has been, necessarily, selective. Thus we have
not discussed several factors which may, in fact, be important. For example, we
have not discussed diﬀerences in the organization of agriculture. In some CEE￿s
collectivized agriculture was eliminated long before central planning. This may
be an important diﬀerence.
Another key diﬀerence in legacies between the NIS and CEE￿s is the extent of
defense orientation. The NIS were hypermilitarized [52], and Russia especially so.
The legacy of large defense enterprises are a special burden for transition. This is
further exacerbated by the fact that many large defense enterprises in the NIS are
concentrated in speci￿c geographical areas which makes restructuring especially
costly. The diﬃculty of defense conversion plagues many transition economies, but
this is almost certainly a diﬀerential burden on the NIS, and especially Russia.
Finally,29 we might note the special diﬃculties associated with diﬀerent re-
source endowments. The Soviet Union was endowed with abundant natural re-
sources. This endowment has passed to some of the successor states, but not all.
Our purpose here is not to discuss the general implications of resource abundance
on growth,30 but there is an important consequence we should discuss here. Be-
cause of energy abundance Soviet enterprises were particularly extensive in their
energy use. The low cost of energy encouraged its use. This is a situation that
cannot survive liberalization, and as energy prices have moved towards world lev-
els this has rendered many enterprises non-viable. Although this should raise the
reward to restructuring, it has also greatly complicated the process.31
28Under Stalin ￿wreckers￿ faced a trip to Siberia. In the post-Stalin period the cost of failure
was typically reduced to loss of position.
29One could also discuss here the implications of breakup. The Soviet Union was an integrated
economy that broke into 15 unequal parts. Breakup is not unique to the NIS; Czechoslovakia
and Yugoslavia has also divided into multiple successor states. It is doubtful, however, that the
latter were as economically integrated as the Soviet Union.
30See [44] for a discussion.
31See [54] for an analysis of how these speci￿c legacies have complicated transition in Russia.
183. Microeconomics of Growth in a Transition Process
3.1. Growth in transition: the two sub-regimes
In 1989-92 most countries in the region abandoned the centralized planning and
began their transition to a market economy. As Figure 1.1 shows, their perfor-
mance in the decade that followed has been very diﬀerent. All countries experience
a decline of output in the beginning of transition.32 In some of them (mostly in
CEE) the decline was rather short and small and was followed by a sustainable
turnaround to growth at rates exceeding those of OECD economies. In the others
(mostly NIS), however, the decline was long and deep and has not been replaced
by a steady recovery.
A critical focus in this paper is to understand the diﬀerence in microeconomic
response, primarily with regard to restructuring, in CEE and NIS. A rough gen-
eralization that we will make is that in the CEE￿s behavior has responded to
changes in the incentives system in a manner consistent with what might be ex-
pected from standard analysis. In the NIS, on the other hand, institutional and
behavioral adaptation have taken place to circumvent the need to change (sur-
vival). One hypothesis is that this is due to the diﬀering legacies from the socialist
period in the two regions; especially in terms of competitiveness. It may also be
due to increased openness of the CEE￿s because of geography.33
Certainly, there is no clear dividing line between CEE and NIS. The most suc-
cessful CEE countries are Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland but even within
them there are large regional diﬀerences. The performance of the Baltic states
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) that used to be a part of Soviet Union is much
more similar to that of CEE than other NIS (this is may be due to the fact that
they joined the USSR only in 1939). In the former Soviet Union, there is also a
huge degree of heterogeneity. Even within Russia there are regions that are doing
really well even by CEE standards.
Despite all these variations, in the analysis below we will refer to ￿typical￿ CEE
and NIS transition experiences as if those two sub-regimes were clearly de￿ned.
The two extremes we will have in mind are the Visegrad countries (Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland) and Russia/Ukraine (see Figure 3.1).
Another important issue is the relationship between growth and transition.
One would like to determine the extent to which a planned economy must trans-
32For explanations of the output decline in the beginning of transition, see [12] and [100].
33Consistent with the diﬀering responses of the Baltics and Kirghizia.
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Figure 3.1: GDP per capita in Vysegrad countries, Russia and Ukraine. 1989=100.
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
form itself so that it can achieve sustained growth. The question is whether tran-
sition is a precondition for growth or a separate process.34 It might be argued that
the secular decline in growth rates (see ￿gure 2.1) in planned economies demon-
strated inability of the SGM to sustain growth. Nonetheless, this does not mean
that liberalization and transition are necessary conditions for growth to resume.35
For our purposes, however, the important question is whether the microeconomic
constraints to growth are aﬀected by transition. Clearly transition has altered the
locus of decision-making for key microeconomic activities. Households and ￿rms
34For example, it could be argued that liberalization enhances static eﬃciency, and thus
increases welfare even if it does not contribute to faster economic growth.
35There are, for example, the cases of Uzbekistan and Belarus. Both countries have undertaken
very little reform but have clearly outperformed neighboring CIS countries in terms of GDP
growth. It is not clear though that the Belarus-Uzbek experience makes a strong case against
transition. First, as discussed above, the price system before liberalization was highly distorted
and therefore it is hard to compare closed planned economies with liberalized open ones. Second,
as [43] argues, the policies pursued by these two countries can only maintain GDP at the pre-
reform levels but cannot sustain long-term growth. Furthermore, [116] shows that the Uzbek
growth puzzle can be explained in terms of initial conditions (low degree of industrialization and
self-suﬃciency in energy) as opposed to policy choices.
20must make decisions rather than central planners. In this context it seems likely
that transition to the market will be critical to prevent an institutional vacuum
that could prevent a recovery of economic growth.
3.2. The microeconomic challenges of economic transition
One of the lessons from the transition experience in NIS countries is that the
price liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization, open trade and privatization
may not be suﬃcient for a successful transition. The inherited legacies may slow
down the development of market institutions which in turn may prevent microe-
conomic agents from adopting the economic incentives of market economy. The
microeconomic agents that act in a transition economy are ￿rms and households.36
Economic development requires that households save and accumulate human cap-
ital and then supply labor and capital to the emerging ￿rms. The transition is
h o w e v e rs o m e w h a td i ﬀerent, since the economy has already been industrialized.37
The labor force has accumulated many of the necessary technical skills associ-
ated with industrialization, and the physical assets are in place. Moreover, ￿rms
already exist that resemble modern ￿rms in capitalist economies. Therefore the
problems are slightly diﬀerent.38 Many of the most critical issues in transition
center around getting appropriate institutions for a market economy.
The basic microeconomic decisions that households make in transition are the
same problems dealt with elsewhere: households choose how much to save and in
which ￿rms to work; they also may choose to become entrepreneurs and establish
new business; existing ￿rms make decisions about restructuring, choices that con-
cern changing both inputs and outputs, and including the size and composition
of their workforce. We will go through all these choices to see in which respects
CEE and NIS are diﬀerent and whether this diﬀerence can explain the better
performance of CEE.
36It is tempting to consider local governments as microeconomic agents, too, as a large part
of recent literature does. Below, we will refer to the role of local governments speci￿cally.
37The few exception of Albania, Romania and some Central Asian countries still have many
more large industrial enterprises than an typical developing economy.
38See [96] for a discussion of the diﬀerence between development and transition.
214. Households
4.1. Savings behavior
Savings are always critical to economic growth, and the need to restructure en-
terprises from the socialist period intensi￿es the need for investment. In￿ows of
capital are one source of resources for this task. These may be critical during the
transition process, but long-term growth more likely depends on savings. This fol-
lows for two reasons. First, the Feldstein-Horioka results suggest that net capital
￿ows are not all that large[41]. Second, transition economies are as likely to suﬀer
from capital ￿ight as they are to bene￿tf r o mn e ti n ￿ows. Hence, restructuring
and investment will likely depend on domestically generated savings.
4.1.1. Savings under Socialism
The extensive growth model required high saving rates. Under socialism most
savings were public savings ￿ the pro￿ts of socialist enterprise and indirect taxa-
tion. Planned economies were able to achieve high rates of capital accumulation
via central control over the composition of output between capital and consump-
tion goods. The pro￿ts of the enterprises sector were controlled by the center and
allocated to enterprises for investment. Capital accumulation under socialism
was quite high; the problem was the low eﬃciency of investment. Many STE￿s
achieved investment rates of over 30% of GDP,39 consistent with the extensive
growth strategy that was pursued [94]. These high savings rates were easy to
achieve given the controls available under planning.40
Household savings in the pre-transition was primarily a response to short-
ages.41 The extensive social safety net reduced the need for private savings.42
Moreover, the limited array of assets that could be accumulated by households in
39Between 1976 and 1981 the ratio of investment to GDP in Romania exceeded 40%!; this
ratio was 37% in Hungary for the same period. See [67, 211].
40It should be noted that pre-transition savings rates may be overstated due to repressed
in￿ation. Arti￿cially high nominal incomes in the presence of price controls leads to high mea-
sured savings calculated as a residual. Were the true transactions prices for consumption used
to de￿ate nominal incomes the resulting level of savings would be reduced. This presumably
explains why Poland had such a high rate of savings in 1989, a year of incipient hyperin￿ation.
41See [67] for a survey of savings in socialist economies.
42Although the need to pay under the table (na levo ￿ ￿on the left￿ ￿ in the former Soviet
Union) did create the incentive for some private savings.
22socialist economies also limited savings.43 State savings accounts were the primary
vehicle for savings, and these accounts paid very low interest rates.
4.1.2. Savings in the Transition
Transition alters the very nature of savings. The rate of capital accumulation is no
longer a planning decision. Because consumption was kept arti￿cially low under
planning it is not surprising that one initial impact of transition was to see declines
in savings rates across the regions. Savings rates in the CEE￿s averaged around
17 to 18 percent in the mid-1990￿s, while in the NIS these rates were generally in
the low 20% range [[113, 41] and ￿gure 4.1]. Presumably this re￿ected an increase
in welfare as a constraint on household choice was lifted. It should be noted,
however, that in addition the uncertain environment of early transition aﬀorded
poor opportunities for savings aside from capital ￿ight.
We can gain some insight into savings behavior across the region by looking
at gross domestic savings. This is derived from the residual of gross domestic
investment and the current account balance. While a crude measure, it does
provide some information that can be used cross-country. In ￿gure 4.1 we observe
that gross savings rates fell with the transition shock before rebounding. This is no
doubt related to the sharp, and presumably unexpected, decrease in incomes that
was experienced with the onset of transition, combined with the policy decision to
alter the composition of output from investment to consumption. The variation
in savings rates across economies also increased with transition. It is also evident
that savings rates vary more in the NIS than in Central Europe, especially if we
exclude Albania.44
With transition the locus of savings moves towards the private sector.45 Enter-
prises retain earnings in order to invest, and households save in order to provide
for future consumption. Centrally-￿nanced investment declines dramatically with
privatization. An important source of motivation for household savings is the
increased risk associated with income streams in the post-socialist environment,
combined with weak institutions to accomplish consumption smoothing (aside
43Note, for example, that housing was almost exclusively publicly supplied, and the public
transportation was extremely well run leading to less need to save for purchasing a car.
44It is clear from the table that a major source of variation in savings is civil war and internal
con￿ict. This is apparent when one considers the cases where negative savings appears, such as
Albania, Armenia, Georgia, and Tajikistan.
45Although governments still have an impact on total savings via public sector de￿cits.
231990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Albania 0.123 -0.142 -0.758 -0.383 -0.168 -0.078
Bulgaria 0.22 0.358 0.188 0.107 0.209 0.248
Croatia NA 0.022 0.195 0.133 0.12 0.014
Czech Republic 0.299 0.368 0.274 0.202 0.201 0.202
Hungary 0.28 0.187 0.149 0.112 0.15 0.189
Macedonia, FYR 0.235 0.11 0.119 0.115 0.041 0.15
Poland 0.328 0.18 0.167 0.165 0.169 0.183
Romania 0.208 0.241 0.23 0.24 0.249 0.229
Slovakia 0.242 0.282 0.241 0.218 0.288 0.316
Slovenia 0.326 0.274 0.265 0.206 0.226 0.213
Average 0.25 0.19 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.17
Coefficient of Variation 0.26 0.83 2.80 1.64 0.87 0.68
Armenia 0.358 0.205 -0.198 -0.037 -0.192 -0.199
Azerbaijan 0.319 0.394 0.17 -0.032 0.034 0.037
Belarus 0.293 0.329 0.337 0.214 0.156 0.226
Estonia 0.223 0.345 0.297 0.235 0.178 0.25
Georgia 0.249 0.249 0.017 -0.189 -0.327 -0.091
Kazakhstan 0.319 0.394 0.302 0.213 0.123 0.196
Kyrgizia 0.04 0.14 0.079 0.04 0.14 0.1
Lithuania 0.252 0.285 0.179 0.145 0.094 0.143
Latvia 0.388 0.435 0.481 0.254 0.195 0.2
Moldova 0.319 0.394 0.15 -0.06 0 -0.007
Russia 0.319 0.394 0.384 0.35 0.291 0.256
Tajikistan 0.137 0.173 0.18 -0.109 -0.002 0.181
Turkmenistan 0.319 0.394 0.21 0.2 0.14 0.12
Ukraine 0.263 0.284 0.364 0.36 0.198 0.168
Uzbekistan 0.157 0.236 0.338 0.159 0.244 0.2
Average 0.264 0.31 0.219 0.116 0.085 0.119
Coefficient of Variation 0.35 0.30 0.77 1.46 1.93 1.10
source: Denizer and Wolf, 1998b: 6.
Figure 4.1: Gross Domestic Savings as a share of GDP in Transition Economies.
24from intra-family transfers).46
The shift in income pro￿les is an important element in understanding post-
transition savings. Income pro￿les of younger, and highly skilled, households
tilt upward, presumably, as lifetime opportunities expand. For older households,
however, the income pro￿le tilts in the opposite way. If ￿nancial markets were
well-developed in transition economies this would reduce savings of the former
group ￿nanced out of increased savings of the latter. In the circumstances of
transition, however, such transfers are limited primarily to intra-family transfers
[See Subsection 4.2 below].
The shock of transition led to the destruction of household savings in many
transition economies. This was the result of oﬃcial price in￿a t i o nc o m b i n e dw i t h
interest-rate ceilings that destroyed the real value of savings. Hence, households
found themselves at the start of transition with asset stocks below their desired
levels. One might suppose that this would lead to increased savings in order
to rebuild these stocks. In addition, the increased uncertainty associated with
transition as well as inability to borrow in case of negative income shocks might
also cause households to increase their target levels of asset stocks.
While the destruction of previous savings may induce households to increase
savings there are important forces that work in the opposite direction. First,
the negative income shock associated with the output decline in most transition
economies should lead to dissaving so that households can maintain their consump-
tion levels. Second, the fact that previous savings was wiped out presumably had
an adverse eﬀect on the form that these savings would take. At least in the early
stages of transition households were reluctant to trust domestic savings institu-
tions and domestic assets. Savings took the form of holding foreign currency or
transferring assets abroad. Savings held in this form are less easily transformed
into investments and therefore less useful (available) for growth purposes,47 at
least until this ￿ight capital returns.48
46The same problem exists in the developing countries: see [23] for discussion of high savings
rates of African rural households that have no access to assets for consumption smoothing.
47This is especially true for capital ￿ight. Of course, the likelihood that ￿ight capital will
return and ￿nance investment is related to the problem of creating a legal and institutional
environment conducive to foreign investment. We discuss this below.
48Using oﬃcial data of the Russian balance of payments various observers [3] and [59] estimate
that capital ￿ight from Russia was relatively stable before the 1998 meltdown, roughly being
about 25-30 bln. per year (one third of total exports or 7 per cent of GDP). After the devaluation
in August 1998, capital ￿ight decreased to about $20 bln. per year, but because the dollar value
of GDP fell, capital ￿ight is now about 10 per cent of GDP. In any event, per capita ￿ight of
25In a study of household surveys conducted in Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland
[31] analyze savings behavior in the transition period. They ￿nd a strong positive
relationship between the relative income position of the household and the savings
rate. More important, perhaps, controlling for incomes, they ￿nd that savings rate
is negatively related to education level.49
A n o t h e rf a c t o rt h a tm a yl e a dt oh i g ho b s e r v e ds a v i n g sr a t e si st h ed e s i r et o
purchase consumer durables. In the pre-transition period stocks of durable goods
were low. As households accumulate reserves to purchase consumer durables mea-
sured savings ￿ calculated as a residual ￿ increases. But this represents consump-
tion rather than savings. Given that this catchup is common across households
from the same starting point (i.e., the start of transition) some overstatement
may appear in the data. The survey evidence [31] shows that households owning
most standard consumer durables save less. While this could be due to a negative
wealth eﬀect, most of their measures of household wealth do not exert a negative
eﬀect on savings. This leaves the absence of credit markets as the likely explana-
tion. This also suggests that some observed savings in these economies may be
transitory; as households make their durable purchases their savings rates may
decline.
A related issue concerns the eﬀect of increased openness on savings. Increased
access to global ￿nancial markets augments domestic capacity to smooth income
￿uctuations. External liberalization, especially with regard to ￿nancial markets,
reduces the need to self-insure; hence, it reduces savings. This increased access
is a welfare gain to the economy. But it also means that if the environment
for foreign investment is hostile, then investment may be heavily constrained by
external liberalization.
Savings behavior may also be aﬀected by the extent and eﬀectiveness of pension
reforms that are yet to be implemented in most transition countries (see [44],
section 3.3.3 for a discussion of pension reform in Poland). Taking into account all
of the abovementioned factors that in￿uence the saving rate one is hard-pressed to
forecast what will happen to the long-run equilibrium saving rate in the transition
$150 per capita is still much higher than in the other transition and developing economies (as
a matter of fact, most CEE economies have positive capital in￿ows). For alternative estimates
of capital ￿ight see [111]. See [55] for quantitative analysis of determinants of capital ￿ows in
transition economies.
49It is unclear how to interpret this ￿nding. It could be that households with high education
levels unsuited to the market are dissaving due to adverse economic conditions. Alternatively,
households with higher education may be experiencing increasing returns to their human capital,
and may be increasing consumption in response to higher wealth.
26economies. Yet it is perhaps safe to conclude that given the remarkable levels of
capital ￿ight experienced in many of these economies, the supply of savings does
not seem to be a binding constraint for economic growth.
4.2. Intra-family transfers
Transition has been associated with sharp declines in (at least apparent) real in-
comes in all countries. Unemployment also became an open phenomenon. Mean-
while, the real bene￿ts to recipients of social transfers also declined sharply. Tran-
sition governments typically lack the capacity to protect all those made vulnerable
by transition. The consequences for the population thus depends, to a large ex-
tent, on the degree to which intra-family transfers can compensate for the absence
of public transfers.50
The importance of transfers in transition is enhanced by the lack of trust in ￿-
nancial institutions.51 Where ￿nancial institutions are well-developed households
can smooth consumption in the face of idiosyncratic shocks. In the absence of such
institutions, intra-family transfers play a larger role. Hence, ￿nancial underdevel-
opment in transition economies has made intra-family borrowing and transfers
important. First, intra-family transfers help to cope with poverty. It is one of
the explanations of the absence of widespread famine in quite a few NIS countries
where more than half of population have incomes below the poverty line.52
The importance of family networks in transition economies is suggested by
their prominence in the socialist period. Informal activities were essential means
for households to cope with the shortages associated with central planning and
price controls. A key question for the transition is the capacity of these net-
works to survive, and to compensate for inadequate public transfers.53 As t u d y
of worker households in Poland [28] found that transfers in 1987 functioned much
50Informal employment is also an eﬀective coping strategy in transition. The eﬀectiveness of
this in Ukraine is discussed in [72].
51Our focus is on transfers within a country. Transfers from abroad ￿ remittances ￿ can also
play an important role. Estimates for Albania show that the average level of remittances was
$700 million, which is quite large considering that Albania￿s GDP in 1996 was about $2.6 billion
[84, 405]. One may also consider the role of diaspora populations in the ranks of entrepreneurs.
This has been frequently commented on with regard to Poland, but is also very important in
Albania [79].
52One should bear in mind that climate is worse than in CEE and NIS than in other regions
of the world. In particular, housing provided with heating is a necessity.
53One can also study the eﬀect of transfers on consumption smoothing in the face of idiosyn-
cratic shocks. See [105].
27Kyrgyz 
Rep
(1993)
Poland
(1992)
Russia
(1993)
Vietn am
(1993)
United 
States
(1979)
Households giving or receiving 21.0 65.0 36.0 68.0 30.0
Transfers as a share of total income 7.4 3.2 4.4 11.9 2.0
Transfers as a share of recipient incom 41.1 7.2 20.1 27.0 6.0
source: World Development Report, 1996: 74.
Figure 4.2: Private Transfers in selected transition economies and the United
States (percent of total)
like means-tested public transfers: they ￿owed from high to low income house-
holds, to large families, and to those experiencing illness. Transfers continued to
play an important role post transition, but at a reduced level. Transfer levels
fell compared with 1987. Thus the role of transfers in alleviating poverty was
reduced.54 Similar results were obtained for Russia [27].
Some evidence on the magnitude of transfers is given in table 4.2, which show
that these can be quite large. As in the Polish case, most of the evidence suggests
that transfers are most likely to go towards those households that would be the
target of safety nets. It also appears, according to a study for Russia, that if
public pensions were eliminated that private transfers would replace 19% of their
amount.
Intra-family transfers play a second important role, in addition to alleviating
poverty. Given the underdeveloped contractual environment, and its eﬀects on the
￿nancial system, investment in transition economies is typically self-￿nanced. This
has consequences for enterprises that we discuss elsewhere. For the creation of new
enterprises, self-￿nancing means, essentially, family ￿nancing. Hence, intra-family
networks can be critical to the process of enterprise formation.55
54In [78] it is argued that while social transfers in Poland during the 1990￿s did reduce poverty
and income inequality this was not their sole focus. Transfers were also directed to the middle
class, and it is argued that this had the eﬀect of reducing the political cost of economic reform.
55As shown in [50] and [75] ￿nancial constraints tend not to bind for small businesses both
in the CEE￿s and the NIS. The only applicable explanation for this is that entrepreneurs can
28Indeed, one can speculate that the reduced role for transfers in the post-
transition period may be due to the fact that now there is an additional role for
such wealth. The use of savings in new business formation may be the cause of the
decline in transfers. In the pre-transition period there were very few outlets for
investment. The key test would be to see whether there is a relationship between
the reduced level of transfers and the rate of small business formation across the
region.
4.3. Labor mobility
Labor mobility is crucial for reallocation of resources in transition economies. In
general, labor mobility rates both in the CEE￿s and in the NIS have been lower
than in OECD countries, and especially in the US (see [13] and [107]). On the
other hand, there are certain diﬀerences between the two sub-regions. While CEE
labor markets have been rather ￿exible, NIS economies have exhibited signi￿cant
labor hoarding and low job mobility in the beginning of transition. Recently,
however, the unemployment rates in the NIS have risen to the levels experienced
in the CEE￿s (see [44] for labor market indicators). The view that NIS labor
markets are much more rigid than those of CEE is no longer true: gross worker
￿ows in the NIS are as high as in CEE or even higher [77] and [56].
It is important to notice, however, that these relatively high levels of labor
mobility in the CEE and NIS refer to intra-regional hiring and separations. In-
terregional mobility is rather low. In ￿gure 4.3 we present indices of interregional
job mobility in selected CEE￿s and in Russia.56 Churning is taking place, but
it is taking place at the local level for the most part. This is rather important,
since industry is highly specialized geographically in the NIS. This means that
intersectoral reallocation of labor is dependent on inter-regional labor mobility to
a greater degree than would be the case in CEE￿s. As both [77] and [56] insist,
there is a lot of job churning in Russian labor market, but workers change bad
jobs for bad jobs rather then bad old jobs for good new jobs.57 As shown in [106],
people who change jobs in Russia do not get a signi￿cantly higher salary (except
for academics and managers). Certainly, the high interregional diﬀerentials [77]
borrow small amounts in the informal credit markets.
56The ￿gures in ￿gure 4.3 are gross job ￿ows across regions. They are the sum of the rates of
jobs created and jobs destroyed.
57[56] provides striking evidence from a study of ￿rm-level data from four Russian regions:
while gross turnover (hirings plus separations per year) was from 29 to 44 per cent of current
employment, new job creation constituted only 1 per cent of current employment.
29Year Bulgaria Poland Romania Slovenia Estonia Russia
1993 - - - - - 0.01
1994 - 0.14 - 0.09 0.21 0.00
1995 0.08 0.20 0.30 0.10 0.35 0.00
1996 0.20 0.12 0.03 0.30 0.03 0.05
1997 0.01 0.26 0.01 0.00 0.26 0.00
Figure 4.3: Interregional job mobility in selected transition countries. Source:
Faggio and Konings [40], Konings￿ calculations using Russian enterprise registry
RERLD.
suggest that the workers should be willing to leave the depressed regions for more
productive jobs in other regions.
Why is interregional mobility in the NIS so low compared with CEE countries?
Again, geography plays an important role. Getting a job in another town may
be rather easy for smaller countries of the CEE region, but much harder for huge
countries of the NIS. Indeed, distances between neighboring regions in Siberia
are much greater than distances between CEE countries. Interregional mobility
in Russia requires moving rather than commuting.58 The costs of moving in
transition economies can be rather high. If households are liquidity constrained
the pecuniary costs of moving may be prohibitive. Moreover, housing markets are
not well developed; this further complicates moving.
The cost of moving is further increased by low unemployment bene￿ts that
are the only source of income that workers have to rely upon while searching
for a new job. Figure 4.4 shows that CEE economies have consistently had much
higher unemployment bene￿ts than in Russia, for example.59 Notice that the data
presented here is the ratio of average bene￿t to average wage. As average wages are
lower in Russia this means that the cash bene￿t is substantially lower. Presumably
58In CEE the maximum distance at which commuting still pays oﬀ is estimated at about
30 km [14]. This is less than diameter of Moscow city and much less than distance between
neighbouring settlements in non-European Russia or Central Asia.
59See [44] and [22] for more details on labor market arrangements and for discussion of the
choice of the level of unemployment bene￿ts in transition countries.
30Czech 
Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia Bulgaria Romania Russia
1991 46.3 41.0 36.0 43.8 60.6 62.6 23.6
1992 24.8 39.3 36.0 31.6 38.1 59.0 11.9
1993 28.3 36.6 36.0 29.2 35.5 37.2 8.4
1994 26.6 33.0 36.0 25.3 34.3 32.5 8.0
1995 25.1 33.5 36.0 27.5 34.9 28.5 8.8
Figure 4.4: Average unemployment bene￿t as a percentage share of the average
wage in selected transition countries. Source: Commander and Tolstopiatenko
(1996).
it is the cash bene￿t that is necessary for covering the cost of movement. Even
ignoring this denominator-bias, however, the diﬀerences in replacement levels is
quite remarkable.
The important implication of high moving costs for workers in NIS countries
is that it allows employers to attach workers to the enterprises through payment
of wages in a non-monetary form [47].60 Since moving costs are high, ￿rms can
exploit workers￿ liquidity constraints and ensure that the option of moving to
a prosperous region is rarely exercised. Certainly, attachment imposes costs on
workers and does not occur in a competitive labor market. Unfortunately, the
depressed communities that the workers want to leave are precisely the ones with
monopsonistic labor markets.
There are three major means of attachment: ￿social￿ (fringe) bene￿ts, wage ar-
rears and payments of wages in kind. The tradition of paying wage via fringe ben-
e￿ts goes back to the paternalistic structure of the Soviet enterprise that provided
its employees with healthcare, housing, kindergartens etc. In many towns social
services are still provided by large ￿rms rather than by municipalities. Although
federal government has obliged ￿rms to divest the social assets to municipalities,
this is happening rather slowly (Figure 4.6).
Provision of social bene￿ts by the older ￿rms reduces incentives for moving
60See Figure 4.5 for evidence on the fact that that wages in kind are much more common
in Russia than in other transition countries. See also [25] for a discussion of the eﬀects of
enterprise-provided social bene￿ts on job mobility and restructuring.
31Country
Share of in-kind wages
in total wages
Share of households
that receive wages in 
Estonia 0.30% 2%
Poland 0.30% 4%
Russia 3% 20%
source: authors calculations using the household surveys at www.worldbank.org/research/transition/house.htm
Figure 4.5: Payments of wages in kind
from the old sector to de novo ￿rms even though the latter may provide a higher
salary.61 Workers prefer to keep two jobs: one with a safe low-wage combined
with social services in the old ￿rm and the other a riskier high-pay but without
access to good social services. Certainly, multiple job holding makes geographical
mobility even more problematic. Instead of ￿nding a job in the new region, the
worker has to ￿nd two jobs simultaneously.62
Another way to attach workers to enterprises is via wage arrears [34]. Empirical
evidence demonstrates that wage arrears exist both in distressed and healthy
￿rms. Therefore wage arrears may also be a strategic instrument that ￿rms use to
exploit workers￿ liquidity constraints.63 The empirical analysis in [34] discovers a
coordination eﬀect: a ￿rm is more likely to have wage arrears if all other ￿rms in
the region have wage arrears. The attachment theory therefore explains why wage
arrears are so widespread in Russia and much less prevalent in CEE economies
(see the Table 4.5). The argument is straightforward: arrears are a symptom
61Diﬀerential tax incidence may also deter workers from switching to new jobs. If old ￿rms
provide social bene￿ts that are not taxed, they may prefer to remain at their current jobs rather
than switch to de novo ￿rms where they would have lower after-tax incomes. Of course, this
eﬀect is mitigated by poor tax collection in transition economies.
62Another motive for the multiple job holding was discussed in Subsection 4.1.2. As shown
in [61], multiple job holding in Russia reduces the need for precautionary savings acting as a
self-insurance device against earnings volatility.
63Thus, one could think of arrears as a method for reducing real wages to levels consistent
with market alternatives. Of course, one would have to explain why workers are more willing
to tolerate arrears than overt real wage cuts. Alternatively, arrears may be understood as a
convenient way for the enterprise to borrow from workers. On the other hand, since the workers
are more liquidity constrained than the ￿rm, it is socially costly.
32Fringe Benefit 1990 1994 1998
Catering 55 50 41
Medical services 64 63 56
Vacation facilities 62 56 44
Professional training 78 71 59
New housing 45 34 18
Kindergarten 66 54 32
source: Biletsky, et al., (1999)
Figure 4.6: Percentage of Russian enterprises providing fringe bene￿ts.
of a labor market that display signi￿cant frictions. When workers cannot move,
employers can expoit their monopsony power. There is no point in trying to
attach workers in the CEE: the costs of interregional mobility are rather low so
even unskilled workers can save enough to move. Even in one of the poorest
transition countries, Albania, hundreds of thousands of workers manage to move
to neighboring countries, let alone regions.64
4.4. Human Capital Accumulation
A key characteristic of transition economies is that they start with relatively high
levels of human capital. The literacy rates are as high, and sometime even higher,
than in OECD countries. In the Baltics, for example, the share of individuals
with upper-secondary education or greater ranges from 80 to 90% of the labor
force, compared with about two-thirds on average for OECD countries [93, 159].
As with physical capital, however, the key issue with regard to economic growth is
the quality of this human capital. In particular, it is important to ask how suited
this human capital is to the needs of a market economy.
The second issue regards the production of human capital. An important
question for long-run growth is whether transition itself will damage the systems
64It is interesting to note that within Russia, the attachment through in-kind wages and wage
arrears occurs only in distant regions. Wage arrears and in-kind payments of wages are virtually
non-existent in large metropolitan areas.
33for re-producing human capital, or whether reformed educational systems will
emerge that produce human capital suited to the needs of these economies.
The Soviet educational system, for example, put more emphasis on science
and engineering rather than on marketing and entrepreneurship. This problem is
present in all transition economies. The level of technical education was very high,
especially in math and physics but humanities and business were lagging behind.65
The pre-reform experience and skills of the managers may be irrelevant.66 In
Romania, for example, small businesses where managers had no prior experience
in the ￿eld performed better than those where managers had such experience [99]
(In Russia, de novo ￿rms reward education but not experience [92]).
Notice that even if the existing stock of human capital is inappropriate for
transition, the move to market-determined wages increases the return to human
capital accumulation. The stories about professors earning less than bus drivers
are not revealing: wages were highly compressed under planning, and market
forces leads to increased variation. Studies of East European economies suggests
that the returns to human capital have increased during transition [108].67 The
same appears to be true in Central Asia [98]. Indeed, one might argue that as the
transition proceeds the returns to human capital should increase, as the share of
the outstanding stock of human capital comprised by transition-era accumulation
increases. The acceleration in the growth rate of the return to human capital
is found in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia. Indeed, according to [45] by
1997 the returns to education had reached levels comparable to those in market
economies. The returns to education in Russia are still very low at 4-5% per a
year of schooling (with over 10% in East Asia and Latin America, 8-9% in OECD
countries and about 7% in Czech Republic) [5]. The NIS economies may be going
along the U-shaped pattern in the returns to human capital accumulation that
CEE countries have gone through with decline and stabilization already seen but
a steady increase not yet documented.
Consider the increase in inequality in earnings in transition economies. In table
4.7 it is apparent that income inequality has increased dramatically in transition
65Whether this is a signi￿cant constraint remains to be seen. Ironically, probably the greatest
impact is on public policy, where the lack of trained analysts ￿ especially economists ￿ is most
pressing.
66It has been observed in most transition economies that entrepreneurs often come from posi-
tions with research institutes and math and physics training. The example of Boris Berezovsky
is probably not atypical.
67In Poland, for example, inequality in labor earnings has increased much more than inequality
in income or consumption[78]. Social transfers account for the diﬀerence.
34Country
Gini Coefficient
Gross Income 
per-capita
1987-88
Gini Coefficient
Disposable 
Income per-capita
1993-95
Balkans and Poland 24 30
Bulgaria 23 34
Poland 26 28
Romania 23 29
Central Europe 21 24
Czech Republic 19 27
Hungary 21 23
Slovakia 20 19
Slovenia 22 25
Baltics 23 34
Estonia 23 35
Latvia 23 31
Lithuania 23 37
Slavic Republics and Moldova 24 40
Belarus 23 28
Moldova 24 36
Russia 24 48
Ukraine 23 47
Central Asia 26 39
Kazakhstan 26 33
Kyrgyz Republic 26 55
Turkmenistan 26 36
Uzbekistan 28 33
All transition 24 33
Figure 4.7: Changes in Inequality during the Transition. Source [91, 41].
35economies over time. Moreover, the variation across countries has increased as
well. This is no doubt due to the increased demands for certain skills combined
with the obsolescence of others. So increased variation in returns is to be expected.
In Central Europe, however, the increases in inequality are small, and still on
the order of low income-inequality countries such as the Nordic countries and
Belgium.68 In the former Soviet republics, on the other hand, the increase in
inequality has been rather dramatic; in Russia and Ukraine the Gini coeﬃcient
on disposable income is signi￿cantly higher than in the United States. This may
be due to diﬀerences in the size of social transfers which tend to be much larger
in CEE countries than in the NIS.69
The low rates of return to some types of human capital may indicate either
irrelevance of the accumulated skills or abundance of the existing human capital
stock. Both are the case to a certain extent. In the long term, however, production
of human capital may become a real problem. The ￿scal system under stress may
not allow to maintain the educational system that produced high levels of human
capital under socialism.
4.5. Health in Transition
An important element of human capital is an individual￿s health status. Changes
in health status can have long-lasting eﬀects on productivity and earning power,
and it can aﬀect decisions with respect to accumulating other skills. Improvements
in health status can lead to increases in the supply of eﬀective labor. Improved
health can also lead to improvements in the quality of labor. A healthier pop-
ulation may invest more in acquiring skills.70 Thus deteriorating conditions in
the health system can have long-lasting eﬀects on the growth potential of the
68Countries with Ginis between 20 and 22 are generally considered very low income-inequality
countries. High income-inequality countries, such as Switzerland and the United States have
Ginis between 33 and 35. See [91, 40].
69Thus average cash transfers as a share of GDP (through 1997) were as high as 17.7% in
Poland, 14.8% in Slovenia, 16.5% in Hungary, and 12.1% in the Czech Republic, compared
with 8.9% in Belarus, 6.9% in Kazakhstan, 7.5% in Russia, and 9.4% in Ukraine. Once again,
Bulgaria (11.8%) and Romania (8.9%) lay somewhere in the middle. See [78, table 8].
70There is both a supply and demand eﬀect at work. The need to cope with a health crisis
may absorb resources that could otherwise be used for education. More important, perhaps,
the healthier the population the greater the return to acquiring skills, as this asset would be
expected to produce income for a longer time period.
36economy.71
An important behavioral shift occurs in transition with regard to health. Un-
der socialism the health system was socialized, as were the costs associated with ill
health. In market economies, however, an increasing share of the costs associated
with ill health fall on the household. Job loss due to ill health, for example, will
have a greater impact on household consumption in the new environment. House-
holds obtain more discretion about their investment in health at the same time
that they bear increased consequences over the outcome. It is not clear, however,
how fast is the response to these changed conditions. It could be that adverse
health outcomes are the result of failure on the part of households to respond
rapidly and eﬀectively enough.
Transition economies, in general, inherited health systems that were rather ad-
vanced for their per-capita incomes, but ill-suited to the health concerns that are
associated with economic development (heart disease, etc). One important ele-
ment is thus mismatch. In poor countries the basic health problem is the incidence
of infectious diseases, malnutrition and inadequate health services. In transition
economies these problems are somewhat less severe. Rather, the problem is that
behaviors associated with higher incomes ￿ diet, smoking, etc. ￿ cause in￿rmities
that the health care system is not capable of coping with. This is partly due to a
lack of reform of the system as these economies developed. It is also due to the
stresses encountered during transition, primarily because of the impact of ￿scal
shortfalls on health systems that were ￿nanced entirely from public revenues. So
increased health problems in transition are due to the disequilibrium or mismatch
in the health system.
One of the key stresses that health systems in transition must cope with is
￿nancial. Under socialism health care was provided from central government
revenues and from state-owned enterprises. The latter tended to provide clinics
and hospital services for employees. Enterprises were a conduit for the supply of
health services to the population. Because the enterprises were state-owned this
amounted to another channel for state-supported health services. With transition,
however, the ￿nancial base for the health system is transformed in consequential
ways. Enterprise privatization necessitates an alteration in this system, with
payroll taxes replacing enterprise-provision of health care services. In addition,
private health care becomes feasible only during transition.72
71This eﬀect has been emphasized by [46] who estimates that improved nutrition accounts for
50% of the growth in per-capita income in Britain from 1790 to 1950.
72The share of the private sector in total health expenditures remains rather small in most
37Because of the observed increases in Russian mortality in the early transition
period the question of a link between health status and the pace of liberalization
has been studied. Early studies (e.g., [102]) detected a negative relationship be-
tween the pace of reform and the increase in mortality. Further research indicates
that the relationship is more complex. Indeed, it appears that the the negative
correlation between speed of reform and mortality holds only in the CEE￿s. In
the FSU, in fact, the most rapid reformers (especially the Baltic republics) have
experienced larger increases in mortality [11, 2025].
5. Enterprise restructuring
The key challenge of transition is to increase the eﬃciency of resource use so
that economic performance can be enhanced. Because economies in transition are
already industrialized, the role of the enterprise takes the center stage. This is a
simple result of the share of GDP produced in the enterprise sector. Improvements
in economic performance depend on enterprise restructuring. Looking across the
region it is apparent that there is a wide range of experiences in this regard. Our
purpose in this section is to explain the characteristic diﬀerences in restructuring
experience.
There are three primary mechanisms through which enterprise restructuring
takes place. First, an improved allocation of resources across uses depends on the
creation of eﬀective markets for capital, labor, and resources.73 Second, existing
enterprises can use resources more eﬃciently. This requires enterprise restructur-
ing. Third, new ￿rm formation is critical to eﬃciency and growth. We consider
new ￿rm creation below in section 6. In this section, our focus is on restructuring.
It is analytically useful to distinguish between various aspects of restructuring
[See [69] and [26]]. The most basic aspect of restructuring is survival-oriented.A s
budget constraints are hardened enterprises must reduce costs to survive. This
aspect of restructuring is reactive and typically involves internal adjustments of
the enterprise. The second aspect is growth-oriented restructuring.74 This involves
transition economies. Hungary appears to be an exception, where the share of the private health
expenditures to GDP (2.06% in 1994) is roughly similar to that of high-income OECD countries.
In the Czech Republic (0.46%), Poland (0.29%) and Russia (0.65%) this share is much smaller
[115, table 8].
73See [44] for a detailed study of product and factor markets in transition economies.
74Alternatively, one may distinguish three types of restructuring: survival-oriented,w h i c h
involves reductions in activities to satisfy budget constraints; internal, which involves reor-
38attempts to enhance revenues by improving existing products and introducing new
ones. It is this second aspect which is critical to the long-run performance of the
economy. It is also more complex and problematic to achieve.
There are two policy instruments that have been used in transition economies
to improve enterprise eﬃciency. First, and most basic, is the elimination of soft-
budget constraints. Eliminating subsidies is critical to induce enterprises to act
more eﬃciently. It is only a ￿rst step, however. The second, and more important,
has been privatization of existing state-owned enterprises. In virtually all transi-
tion countries some form of privatization has occurred. Although the connection
between privatization and improved eﬃciency appears straightforward theoreti-
cally, the evidence in fact is more complex. One of the most important puzzles
of economic transition is the weak empirical relation between privatization and
economic restructuring.
We consider both of these issues in this section. Our concern is to understand
what factors inhibit enterprise restructuring, and to explain the diﬀerences in this
relationship across the region.
5.1. Soft budget constraints
In most transition economies formal subsidies have been eliminated [101]. Some
evidence is available in ￿gure 5.1. Although explicit subsidies have declined as a
share of GDP throughout the region [[101], [36]], they have often been replaced by
informal subsidies. The latter take various forms. These are tax arrears that are
written oﬀ or restructured, inter￿rm arrears that are never paid and wage arrears.
The percentage of bad loans has also been notorious. The most important form of
subsidies in the NIS is the continued delivery of low-cost energy. Enterprises do
not pay the full cost of their energy use, and energy suppliers fall into tax arrears
with the government.
The composition and the magnitude of soft budget constraints varies across
region. They are more widespread in NIS, less so in Romania, and relatively small
in CEE.
Why are soft budget constraints so common in NIS and so rare in CEE?
The explanations are diﬀerent for the subsidies provided by private and public
creditor.75 The most straightforward explanation is competition. When there
ganization of practices within the enterprise, and; external, which involves changing the way
enterprises interact with other enterprises and consumers. See [69] for an application.
75Though in many cases ￿ e.g., Gazprom in Russia ￿ it is very hard to draw the line between
391994 1995 1996 1997
Eastern  Europe an d the Baltics
Bulgaria 1.3 1.2 0.8 0.8
Croatia 2 1.8 1.9 1.9
Czech Republic 3.1 2.7 2.2 2.4
Estonia 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.3
Hungary 4.5 3.8 3.9 3.3
Latvia 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4
Lithuania 1.7 1.1 1.3 0.9
Poland 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.4
Romania 3.8 4.1 4.3 2.6
Slovak Republic 3.2 2.8 2.4 2.2
Slovenia 1.6 1.6 1.2 1.3
CIS
Armenia 12.8 0.9 0.1 0.4
Azerbaijan 5.4 2.2 2.1 0.7
Belarus 6.3 3.4 2.9 1.3
Georgia 13.8 1.1 1 1.5
Russia n.a. n.a. 6.2 6.4
Uzbeksitan 1.9 3.4 4 3.2
source: Commander 1999.
Figure 5.1: Budgetary Subsidies to Enterprises (% of GDP)
40is only one buyer a situation of mutual dependence develops. The seller cannot
cut oﬀ the buyer if that will eliminate the only enterprise for the market. The
seller responds by delivering goods even when the buyer is in arrears. Essentially,
the seller is lending to the buyer to prevent the alternative of closure. The same
applies to workers. They lend their wages to their employer since there is no other
employer in the town. The explicit subsidies and tax arrears may be explained by
politicians￿ self-interest. We address the political explanation in the Subsection
5.6.
5.2. Privatization and Restructuring
Privatization is seen as the key policy instrument to induce former state-owned
enterprises to restructure. The argument is that changing ownership will provide
managers with high-powered and correctly aligned incentives, and hence lead to
improvements in economic performance.
5.2.1. Analytical Issues
Although privatization has been widespread in transition economies the degree
to which it has induced restructuring varies across economies [see 5.2.3]. This
presents a puzzle if restructuring is considered as the only means of enterprise
survival. In [53] it is argued that enterprises in transition economies actually
have an alternative strategy for survival; investing in relations. Investments in
relational capital are useful because they aﬀord the enterprise the ability to survive
without satisfying budget constraints.76 A c c o r d i n gt ot h i st w o - d i m e n s i o n a lv i e w
of restructuring, enterprises vary according to their initial degree of ineﬃciency, d
(distance to the market), and their level of relational capital, r. Enterprises can
survive either by reducing d or increasing r. The actual choice an enterprise will
make depends on its initial values of d and r, and on the relative returns to these
activities.
Once we accept this two-dimensional picture it is apparent that the eﬀective-
ness of privatization will depend on initial conditions as well as policies that are
chosen. For example, resource abundance may increase the likelihood of subsi-
dies; hence the return to investing in relational capital may be higher in such
private and public.
76For example, relational capital allows enterprises to engage in barter, to pay taxes in kind,
and to engage in arrears.
41economies.77
Notice that relational capital requires non-transparency ￿ agents are treated
idiosyncratically. This suggests that economies with legacies of non-transparency
may see greater investment in r. The more transparent are a country￿s institutions
the more costly is investing in r; hence, in these economies enterprises will see a
greater relative return to restructuring.78
5.2.2. Methodological Issues
Disentangling the empirical relationship between privatization (ownership type)
and enterprise restructuring is complex. We want to discern whether ownership
type leads to greater restructuring. There are three main problems. First, al-
though easy to understand, restructuring is not easy to de￿ne. It refers to a
multitude of changes in the way the enterprise performs. Hence, obtaining indi-
cators of restructuring can be complex, and often diﬀe r sa c r o s ss t u d i e s .S o m eu s e
quantitative indicators, such as the change in output, revenue, or employment.
Others use qualitative indicators from surveys.
The second problem is selection bias. Studies of enterprise restructuring esti-
mate an equation of the form:
yi = α + βxi + γPi + εi (5.1)
where yi is a performance indicator, xi is a vector of enterprise characteristics
that would include initial performance, and Pi is the ownership type. Studying
the eﬀects of privatization on restructuring involves estimating γ. The problem
is that ownership types are most likely not randomly determined.79 If ownership
type is systematically related to some determinant that also aﬀects yi, but is not
included in xi,t h e ne s t i m a t e so fγ will be biased. For example, are privatized
enterprises more productive because they are privatized, or were enterprises with
77Notice that an energy-abundant country can not only aﬀord subsidies, but large exports
leads to currency appreciation that may make manufacturing exports less competitive. Hence,
it may also increase d for many enterprises.
78Note that the promise of EU accession may play a similar role: as soon as the country joins
EU, the relational capital loses all its value. Anticipating lower returns to the relational capital,
managers prefer restructuring.
79In [89] this hypothesis is tested directly on enterprises in the Czech Republic. They ￿nd
that, indeed, enterprises were not chosen randomly for diﬀerent privatization methods, and that
controlling for selection bias alters the evaluation of its eﬀects.
42better initial conditions more likely to be privatized.80 Many empirical studies
of restructuring pay attention to selection bias, but it is not always easy to ￿nd
appropriate instruments.
The third problem is that measuring ownership is hardly straightforward. It
is easy to distinguish between state-owned enterprises and those that are not.
But within the latter category one ￿nds many diﬀerent types depending on which
group dominates ownership: employees, managers, ￿nancial companies, domestic
outsiders, foreign outsiders. These various forms of private ownership are quite
heterogeneous, and it would be surprising if the eﬀects on restructuring would be
invariant to these forms. But the decision to choose which type is not random,
which introduces the noted selection bias. Moreover, within individual countries
there is often not suﬃcient numbers in all types to discern the eﬀects of the
diﬀerent categories.
5.2.3. Empirical Studies
Various studies have attempted to study the connection between privatization and
restructuring, and many have tried to control for selection in various ways [e.g.,
[36], [97], and [49]].81 In [97] the initial level of productivity is used to control for
selection bias.82 But this works only to the extent that productivity is measured
correctly. In [49] selection is controlled for by dropping enterprises purchased by
insiders ￿ which is eﬀective at controlling selection due to insider bias, but does
not deal with other sources83 ￿ and by estimating a ￿xed eﬀects model. Other
papers use instrumental variables techniques to control for selection.
Empirical studies tend to focus on privatization in one country or a group of
neighboring countries. There are few studies that include data across the NIS
and CEE. Nonetheless, it is possible to obtain some results by comparing across
studies. There are several robust ￿ndings. First, the type of privatization mat-
ters: inside ownership appears to diﬀer little from state ownership, while outside
80[33] surveys a vast array of empirical studies on restructuring. They observe that the
selection bias is important, but that the direction of the bias seems to diﬀer across studies.
81For a survey of such papers and a rating of their eﬀorts to deal with selection bias, see [33].
82Because of the diﬃculty in measuring capital services, [97] use energy use as a proxy. But
this means that countries where enterprises have not had incentives to reduce energy use in
transition will have higher ￿measured￿ capital services, and hence lower productivity growth.
Hence, diﬀerences across countries ([97] uses pooled data for various economies) in energy prices
can contaminate productivity measurements.
83For example government decisions about which enterprises to privatize based on political
decisions.
43ownership tends to induce more signi￿cant eﬀects on performance. Second, and
related to the ￿rst, it is typically observed that the impact of privatization on
restructuring is greater the more concentrated is ownership. Third, competition
matters; the greater the degree of product market competition the greater the
level of enterprise performance. Fourth, it appears that there are diﬀerences ac-
cording the measure of performance used. In [49] the eﬀects of ownership types are
found to be much greater with regard to revenue and productivity than with cost
or employment. One interpretation of this ￿nding is that hardening the budget
constraint causes common eﬀects across ownership types with regard to cost and
employment. This is a reactive response, and will hardly diﬀer based on who con-
trols the ￿rm. But increasing revenues and productivity requires entrepreneurial
eﬀort which will likely diﬀer according to ownership type.
Perhaps most important for our purposes, the evidence strongly suggests that
the eﬀect of privatization on restructuring is much greater in CEE￿s than in the
NIS.
The results from empirical studies of restructuring suggest that privatization
is eﬀective only when private owners are able to control management. Therefore
the eﬀect of privatization depends on the strength of corporate governance.
5.3. Corporate governance and enterprise ￿nance
The con￿ict of interests between managers and owners is a problem in all economies,
but it is paramount in transition economies. The corporate governance environ-
ment has been very poor in transition economies [44]. This is partly due to the
legacy: there were no joint stock companies before the reform started. All legal
and market institutions had to be designed from scratch. The transition countries
had to re-introduce such things as rule-of-law, an independent court system, stock
markets, insurance etc. Since institutional memory in CEE￿s is much better (there
are still generations that lived under capitalism) than in the NIS, the success in
re-building these institutions was very diﬀerent. This is not a problem of legisla-
tion: most NIS countries have adopted legislation that is the same or even better
as in CEE or OECD. However the enforcement of the laws in the NIS has been
rather poor.
Managers use the imperfections of legal system and the poor enivonment for
corporate governance to divert pro￿ts.84 The widespread use of transfer pricing
84The absence of a managerial labor market at the onset of transition is an important factor
in the incentive to divert income. Without managerial labor markets, incumbent managers
44and barter payments in Russia helps managers divert corporate pro￿ts away from
the company (often oﬀshore) leaving outside investors with nothing.85 Under
the present legal system it is very hard for minority shareholders to in￿uence
management. Only when outside investors take over a quali￿ed majority can they
replace the manager (and therefore become insiders themselves). And often, local
governors protect incumbents against the activities of outside shareholders, even
to the point of using police to prevent them from entering shareholder meetings.86
Good corporate governance also requires clearly de￿ned bankruptcy proce-
dures. Russia￿s recent bankruptcy experience shows however that a good bankruptcy
law does not make things any better if there are no independent courts to enforce
it [86]. In 1998, Russia has introduced a long overdue bankruptcy law. The law
w a ss i m i l a rt ot h eM e x i c a no n ea n dw a sp r a i s e db ym a n ya ss u ﬃciently tough
on managers giving creditors a good chance to get their money back. After the
inception of the law, number of bankruptcies has indeed skyrocketed. The credi-
tors (including federal government) however have not received much. The judges
eﬀectively controlled by regional governments often ruled in favor of the latter.
As argued by Bergloef and von Thadden [6] corporate governance in transi-
tion economies is developing in the direction of German-Japanese model rather
than the Anglo-Saxon one. Small investors are relatively unprotected. Only large
shareholders can expect positive returns. This makes the stock market very thin
and makes reallocation of capital quite costly. Therefore ￿rms that contemplate
restructuring cannot easily ￿nd external sources of ￿nance. On the other hand,
until they restructure they do not have enough pro￿ts to re-invest. The liquidity
constraints caused by underdevelopment of ￿nancial markets and poor corporate
governance create the vicious circle of survival without restructuring. Managers
make suboptimal decisions; they invest in relational capital rather than in restruc-
turing. [62] provide evidence on the use of barter by managers to survive without
restructuring. Also, managers can use barter (relational capital) as a means of
entrenchment (as projects with asymmetric information in [37] ). Lack of restruc-
turing and managers￿ entrenchment reduce incentives of outside investors to bring
have few ways of appropriating returns that may be due to their eﬀorts, unless they manage to
own a signi￿cant block of shares. With privatization schemes that gave incumbent managers
relatively small packets (compared to workers) the incentive to divert assets was larger than
otherwise might have been. A managerial labor market allows incumbents to earn returns on
any improvements they are responsible for, even if they do not own a large bloc of shares. For
an early analysis of this issue, see [68].
85These instruments are also used to evade taxes.
86See, [8] for a littany of corporate governance tragedies in Russia.
45cash and even replace managers.
5.4. Role of competition and openness
Competition is an important contributor to improved economic performance.
Competition improves static eﬃciency by pressuring managers to maximize prof-
its. The eﬀect on dynamic eﬃciency is less clear, however. Competition forces
enterprises to keep up with improvements in technology, but monopoly pro￿ts
are the primary goal of innovators. In transition economies the legacy is of mo-
nopolistic enterprises that lacked all dynamism. Hence, it is restructuring that
is crucial to improved performance, and the role of competition is almost surely
paramount.87
Competition can come from two sources: the internal market, and increased
openness to foreign competition. Empirical evidence suggests that competition
improves eﬃciency, though the eﬀect appears to be non-linear. More competition
is good, but too much inhibits restructuring.88
The extent to which enterprises face competition is correlated with ownership
types. Privatized enterprises (and new entrants) are much more likely to face
competition that state-owned enterprises [36, 136]. There are perhaps two reasons
for this. First, state-owned enterprises may perceive less competition because they
receive state protection. New entry may be more diﬃcult in enterprises dominated
by large state-owned enterprises. Second, and more important, the nature of
privatization programs themselves may be responsible. Those enterprises left in
state hands tended to be in less competitive sectors of the economy.89
Even if ￿rms maximized pro￿ts, the lack of competition and openness could
prevent the economy from achieving eﬃcient outcomes. The Soviet industrializa-
tion model created highly specialized ￿rms that often relied on a single supplier.90
Within a country many enterprises faced only one potential buyer. Given con-
tractual diﬃculties and lack of information these situations of bilateral monopoly
87Though probably still secondary compared with elimination of soft-budget constraints. No-
tice, that as long as soft-budget constraints exist competition is irrelevant.
88See [36, 132]. This eﬀect was ￿rst analyzed by [69]. This appears to be due to the fact that
restructuring relies so heavily on internal ￿nancing. Hence, as competition increases internal
￿nancing dries up.
89This is one of the factors which makes it so diﬃcult to estimate the eﬃciency-enhancing
eﬀect of privatization: selection bias created by privatization.
90See [69] and [12] for discussion of the role of asset speci￿city and supplier dependence, and
[82] for ￿rm-level evidence.
46were reinforced. Under such circumstances openness of the economy becomes cru-
cial. Firms that could compete in the export markets experienced much higher
returns to restructuring. The diﬀerence between performance of exporting and
non-exporting industries in the transition economies is striking. In Russia, indus-
trial output declined by about a half in 1991-98. The decline in the oil industry
was only 10 per cent. The same dichotomy occurred in CEE. In Hungary, the
sectors that were exporting to the West experienced little decline or even some
growth while those oriented on sales to the domestic market or the CMEA de-
clined signi￿cantly. Since on average, CEE economies were less specialized and
geographically closer to the Western Europe, they found it easier to compete in
the export market.
Lack of access to foreign markets may be considered a temporary barrier. If
a ￿rm were able to borrow and invest in building competitive production lines
they would be able to restructure. The corporate governance problems we have
discussed have the eﬀect, however, of leaving NIS ￿rms liquidity constrained. The
only way to ￿nance restructuring is to reinvest pro￿ts. Pro￿ts, however, are low
precisely because of lack of access to export markets.
Empirical studies have shown that competition has a positive impact on per-
formance both in CEE and NIS [33]. A large survey (3000 ￿rms in 20 transition
economies) [21] supports the positive eﬀect of competition in general and foreign
competition in particular.91 The eﬀect is very strong within countries: the evi-
dence the from comprehensive dataset of Russian ￿rms shows large and signi￿cant
eﬀects of competition [18]. This is also observed in Mongolia that lags behind CIS
in terms of development of market institutions [4].
5.5. Contractual imperfections
Underdevelopment of legal institutions imposes a heavy burden on transition
economies. The high level of asset speci￿city inherited from STE requires en-
forcement of sophisticated contracts. As mentioned above, in most transition
countries, legislation has made it feasible to write all kinds of contracts but the
court system generally fails to enforce them. This is especially common in NIS
91The distinction between domestic and foreign competition is important. It is not only due
to the weakness of domestic market that exporting ￿rms outperform domestically oriented. The
eﬀect is observed not only in CEE but also in Russia where the domestic market is potentially
quite large. [2] shows that those Russian regions that exported more before the transition, have
performed signi￿cantly better than others.
47(see [50] and [74] ). In CEE countries courts do not work perfectly but are in-
deed used in con￿ict resolution. In NIS, ￿rms tend not to believe that courts will
enforce contracts.92
There are a few alternative solutions to contract enforcement through courts.
Relational contracting is one potential solution that is used rather widely [74].
Contract enforcement via organized crime is also very common in small businesses
[51]. Payments in kind can be used as a hostage in contract relationships to
mitigate the hold-up problem [90].
The incomplete contracts literature [63] suggests that vertical integration may
also help to overcome contractual imperfections. Indeed, vertical integration is
quite common in these environments. Registered vertically integrated groups [19]
employ 8% of industrial employment in Russia; unregistered groups are much
larger and have even greater employment. Vertically integrated ￿rms are pre-
dominant in such industries as oil extraction and processing, natural gas, steel
production, cars etc. [17] show that controlling for other factors vertical integra-
tion does help to increase labor productivity.
Though organized crime, barter and vertical integration reduce transaction
costs of relation-speci￿c investment, these solutions are not at all innocent. Or-
ganized crime has a strong negative eﬀect on small business development. Barter
reduces transparency and is therefore very costly for corporate governance and
tax collection. Vertical integration forecloses markets. Figure 5.2 shows that the
greater the share of vertically integrated ￿rms in a market, the lower is the rate
of entry.93
5.6. Enterprise-government interaction
One of the key barriers to restructuring is political pressure. Since restructuring
results in (at least a temporary) increase in unemployment, both federal and lo-
cal government oﬃcials are reluctant to encourage it.94 Increased unemployment
92See [65] for evidence on enterprise attitudes towards contract enforcement and the use of
law.
93This is consistent with the discussion of the role of Korean groups (￿chaebols￿) that have
been instrumental in promoting growth and investment but whose rigidity has become a burden
in the Asian crisis.
94The simple model in [103] describes the nature of bargaining between politicians and ￿rms.
Politicians are interested in maintaining employment levels rather than restructuring. Managers
would like to restructure and get rid of the burden of excess employment, but they are compen-
sated by explicit or implicit subsidies from the politicians. Of course, under central planning
481996- 97 1995- 96 1995- 97
MES - 0. 17*** ( 0. 04) - 0. 15*** ( 0. 05) - 0. 30*** ( 0. 05)
CR1 0. 031*** ( 0. 006) 0. 098*** ( 0. 010) 0. 096*** ( 0. 011)
Gr owt h0 . 030*** ( 0. 002) 0. 085*** ( 0. 002) 0. 074*** ( 0. 002)
Vshar e  - 0. 018*  ( 0. 01) - 0. 084***  ( 0. 026) - 0. 074***  ( 0. 028)
Cons t 0. 021*** ( 0. 004)  0. 023*** ( 0. 006) 0. 054*** ( 0. 007)
O bs. 3882 3438 3336
R2 0. 05 0. 36 0. 29
Figure 5.2: OLS regressions for entry rates in Russian product markets. Vshare
is the share of vertically integrated ￿rms in market, MES is minimum eﬃciency
scale, CR1 is the market share of the largest ￿rm in the market, growth is the
growth rate. Source: [19].
may also exacerbate ￿scal problems. To a large extent these problems are not
speci￿c to transition economies. But the degree of restructuring required in tran-
sition economies is much greater than in most other countries, hence the political
economy issue becomes paramount.
Another problem with local government is that oﬃcials are rarely interested in
the geographical mobility of products and resources in general and labor in par-
ticular. Local authorities in depressed company towns are reluctant to let skilled
workers leave for other more prosperous regions since this would decrease the av-
erage income of the town. Therefore there is little surprise that local authorities
are quite happy to see social assets (hospitals, kindergartens, housing, recreation
facilities) continue to be operated by ￿rms. As we argued above ￿rms may use the
social assets as a means of attaching workers which is perfectly aligned with local
politicians￿ interests [48]. On the other hand, local governments in prosperous
communities that represent incumbent workers may not be happy to see incoming
skilled labor since it would drop the wages and therefore welfare of median voter.
Hence, the proliferation of administrative barriers to geographical mobility. The
only party that is not represented in the political process are the skilled workers
who want to move. Their interests are in theory protected by a federal govern-
ment that should disburse targeted bene￿ts to encourage mobility. Cash-strapped
the opposite was the case ￿ managers wanted to pad employment to provide a safety factor in
ful￿lling plans. Nonetheless, there is some evidence that is consistent with this story [33] in
transition economies. On the other hand, as we have discussed above [section 5.2.3] it matters
a great deal who the managers are; insiders and outsiders act very diﬀerently.
49budgets, however, do not allow for these bene￿ts to be set at any reasonable level.
It is important to emphasize that the behavior of regional and local authorities
appears to be explained better by the assumption of rational economic agents as
opposed to ideology-constrained politicians. As [2] shows, the political orientation
of a regional governor has no signi￿cant eﬀect on either the choice of policies nor on
the performance of the regional economy. This suggests that the policy decisions of
local governments are determined, for the most part, by the initial conditions and
constraints that they face. One might then argue that the promise of EU accession
may be an important factor in restraining the predatory impulses of oﬃcials in
CEE￿s; the promise of accession may operate as a commitment device to provide
regional governments with the right incentives [44]. In CEE￿s, politicians know
that they will have to cancel the most ineﬃcient policies in a few years, while in
NIS, there is no such clear endgame.
6. New ￿rm creation
Developing new ￿rms and fostering small business is an important aspect of eco-
nomic transition in at least in two respects. First, the legacies of the STE leave
huge market niches especially in services. By ￿lling these niches, small business
can signi￿cantly improve welfare. Moreover, new ￿rms are not burdened by the
past; they are much more likely to follow market-like practices. It is not sur-
prising, then, that in many CEE countries, small business formation has indeed
become a key engine of growth.
Second, small businesses provide an income source for workers that are laid oﬀ
by restructuring ￿rms. Given the state of public ￿nance in transition economies,
the bene￿ts received by the unemployed are rather low, despite high payroll taxes.
If more restructuring results in greater unemployment, and if this causes higher
taxes to support the unemployed, the economy can end up in a ￿scal trap[1]. Self-
employment can thus act as a safety valve that prevents this trap from emerging.
The social cost of restructuring is greater when self-employment is less common,
and therefore the political pressure to delay restructuring increases.
The rates of small business formation varies a lot across countries. Since
pre-reform distortions were higher in the NIS than in CEE, the potential for
small business growth should have been higher in the NIS. This potential has not
materialized: the number of small business per capita in Poland is roughly ten
50t i m e sa sh i g ha si nR u s s i a( a c c o r d i n gt oo ﬃcial statistics).95 In this section we
will try to analyze an entrepreneur￿s decision to start up and invest in a small
business in a transition country and compare environment in which small ￿rms
operate in CEE and NIS.
There are several potential barriers for small businesses. First, given the level
of ￿nancial development in the transition, small businesses may face ￿nancial
constraints. Second, there could be tough competition from other small businesses.
All the pro￿table niches have already been taken and it is hard to get high pro￿t
margins. Third, there may be predatory behavior of government and/or private
rackets.
Surprisingly, the empirical evidence indicates that ￿nancial constraints are not
critical either in CEE or in NIS [36]. In a survey of small manufacturing ￿rms
in Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine, Johnson et al. [75] show that
access to credit does not aﬀect investment. Frye [50] studies shops in Moscow
and Warsaw and also corroborates that shopkeepers do not see ￿nance as major
problem. The niches for small business are so huge that the businesses that do
get through are able to earn enough pro￿t to support business growth.
There is a clear dichotomy between CEE and NIS in terms of competition
and government predation. In the CEE, competition has already become an
important constraint. Unlike their counterparts in Moscow, shopkeepers in Poland
name competition as their major concern [51]. In the NIS, the major problem
is predation. Small businesses are taxed and regulated at exorbitant rates. In
order to survive they hide some or all of their incomes and become part of the
unoﬃcial economy. Once in the unoﬃcial economy, the ￿rm is prevented from
seeking contract enforcement and protection from the state. These services are
provided by members of organized crime who extract most of the monopoly rents
in exchange.96 In the CEE (inclusive of Romania and Bulgaria) small ￿rms report
that neither government nor private rackets are an important problem. In the NIS
￿rms do not grow enough to ￿ll out all the niches; hence competition is much less
intense and monopoly rents correspondingly greater. These rents are an attraction
to predators, whether public or private. Hence, there is a relationship between
the extent of competition and the degree of predation.
95Many small ￿rms are just dummies registered for tax avoidance purposes. Given Russia￿s
larger unoﬃcial economy [73], one could assume that the share of tax dummies among small
￿rms is greater in Russia than in Poland. Therefore, the diﬀerence is, almost certainly, even
more striking.
96Corrupt bureaucrats also play a role.
51Country Romania (4 cities) Poland (Warsaw) Russia (Moscow)
Used courts in last two
years
0.20 0.14 0.19
Needed to use courts
but did not
0.15 0.10 0.45
Can use courts against
government
0.51 0.41 0.50
Can use courts against
business partner
0.67 0.45 0.65
Contacted by racket in
the last 6 months
0.00 0.08 0.39
Does one need a ’roof’
(’umbrella’) to operate?
0.01 0.06 0.76
Figure 6.1: Government vs. private of contract enforcement for small businesses.
Source: [99] and [51]. ￿Roof￿ and ￿umbrella￿ are euphemisms for ma￿a protection
in Russia and Poland, correspondingly.
This clear-cut dichotomy helps to explain why small business performance is
so diﬀerent in the CEE and NIS. In a competitive world, investment that reduces
marginal cost is pro￿table and therefore will be undertaken. In the predation
model, however, the fruits of the investment will be expropriated by rent-seekers.
Also, investment and growth make the ￿rm more visible, less mobile and therefore
subject to more bribe extortion.
This may explain another stylized fact. Controlling for the ￿rms￿ lifecycle, [80]
￿nds that small businesses in CEE are more eﬃcient than the large ￿rms. This
is despite the fact that at the start of transition the opposite was true.97 In the
NIS, however, there is no signi￿cant diﬀerence in performance [80].
Notice that the dividing line with respect to the small business environment
lies to the east of Bulgaria and Romania. From a small businessman￿s point
of view, Romania and Bulgaria (as well as the Baltic States) are closer to the
Visegrad countries than to the NIS.98
Apart from government predation, the development of small business is slowed
down by a number of economies of scale that are present in the NIS countries.
97See [68] for a theoretical analysis, and [15] for empirical analysis.
98Actually, [99] reports that most small businesses in Romania do not understand the words
￿umbrella￿ and ￿roof￿.
52One is due to the peculiar institution of barter that has ￿ourished in Russia and to
al e s s e re x t e n ti nt h eo t h e rN I Se c o n o m i e s .F o ral a r g e￿rm, the transaction costs
of barter may be low relative to other costs, as the more diversi￿ed the ￿rm is, the
easier it will be to solve the problem of double-coincidence-of-wants. On the other
hand, a small single-product entrepreneur cannot aﬀord to hire a barter broker,
nor to spend her time searching for appropriate barter exchanges. Therefore thin
monetary markets and thick barter ones bene￿tl a r g e￿rms and hurt smaller ones.
In addition, barter is more common in enterprises with historical relations which
again presents a bias against new enterprises [70].
Another source of increasing returns is social asset ownership. As we men-
tioned above, a large share of social assets still belongs to large ￿rms who use
them strategically for attaching their workers. The quality of municipal social
services is much lower. Therefore the employees of small ￿rms that cannot aﬀord
running their own hospitals or kindergartens have to be compensated for being
deprived of the higher quality social services.
Political economy is also important. Since the number of small businesses in
the NIS is very low, politicians pay greater attention to the interests of large ￿rms.
Therefore most subsidies and tax breaks tend to go to large enterprises.
7. Conclusions
Although CEE and NIS entered transition with similar problems due to a shared
insitutional legacy, their growth performance has been strikingly diﬀerent. We
have discussed possible microeconomic explanations of this diﬀerence. The fail-
ures of NIS economies can be explained, in part, by the diﬀerential legacies from
the prior regime. We have emphasized factors which have hampered the devel-
opment of market institutions because, we have argued, this has reduced labor
mobility, the rate of ￿rm formation and the degree of restructuring in existing
￿rms. We have also emphasized the role of openness and competition in explain-
ing diﬀerential performance across the region.
These factors, combined with defects in the political and legal system, have
given rise to a vicious circle of resistance to reform in the NIS. Workers cannot
move. Privatization does not provide existing ￿rms with incentives to restructure.
New ￿rms are not established or even if established do not grow as fast as they
could. Given this environment, local governments act in a predatory fashion which
further worsens the returns to serious reform. The situation in the CEE￿s is rather
diﬀerent. The rewards for success are more apparent due to greater transparency,
53and they are often greater due to greater access to world markets.
Our purpose in this paper was not only to provide a general account of mi-
croeconomics of growth in the region but also to set the framework for future
country studies. By introducing two extreme models (a ￿typical CEE￿ economy
and a ￿typical NIS￿ economy) we intended to provide future researchers with a
set of dimensions along which one can measure how close each economy is to one
of these extremes. Because transition is multi-dimensional, however, the position
of a country on this spectrum may diﬀer depending on the criterion. Thus, Bul-
garia and Romania ￿ where growth performance has been in between the NIS
and the Visegrad ￿ seem to be intermediate cases from the microeconomic point
of view, too. In Bulgaria and Romania, enterprise restructuring has been rather
slow making them similar to NIS. On the other hand, the rates of small business
development are rather close to those in Visegrad countries. Perhaps, the most
interesting question of transition can be answered by studying which of these two
positions on the spectrum dominates long-run economic performance in Bulgaria
and Romania.
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